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I – Introduction 
In Virginia Woolf’s The Waves1, one of the novel’s main characters, Bernard, is constantly 
driven by a strong urge to describe his surroundings. His need to describe forces Bernard to 
employ language as a medium in his constant attempt at representing his immediate 
surroundings. He thereby creates a relation between himself and the world that goes through 
language. Bernard’s need to describe the world becomes a barrier between himself and the real 
world already at an early age. And he only discovers, while shaving as a middle-aged man, that 
it is not possible for him to grasp and represent the world fully through language. This discovery 
leaves Bernard disenchanted with language and its possibilities as his experience of the real 
world never seems to genuinely translate into prose. Bernard struggles with the fact that his 
descriptions only capture life through mimetic representation. He discovers that re-presentation 
is always separated from the real by language. Description is never the same as the real, as well 
as it always seems to transgress that which it is representing. Bernard discovers that his urge to 
describe life through language is an attempt at describing everything, but at every turn of his 
description he is confronted with language’s inability to do exactly that. This discovery forces 
Bernard to reassess his narrative strategy as well as the possibility of transferring knowledge 
through language.  
The question that Woolf is posing through Bernard is: How is it possible to describe the 
real world objectively, all the while being a part of it? (Banfield, The Phantom Table 59)2 
Bernard’s struggle with language in the The Waves, in other words, is also Woolf’s struggle 
and the struggle of modernist fiction. Woolf not only represents the problematic relationship 
between representation and knowledge on the level of content in The Waves, she also 
emphasises the problematic nature of language through the form of the novel. In The Waves she 
                                                 
1 Woolf, Virginia. The Waves. 1931. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Print.   
2 Banfield, Ann. The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell and the Epistemology of Modernism. 2000. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Print.  
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employs experimental narrative structures, as the novel is made up by a number of subjective 
internal monologues. The subjective soliloquies are only broken up by short interludes 
describing the sun passing over a deserted beach. Woolf’s experimentation and innovation, as 
well as Bernard’s, offers a closer look at the relationship between the epistemology of 
Modernism and the way in which knowledge is at stake in the novel.  
In the article “A Semiotic Definition of Aesthetic Experience and the Period Code of 
Modernism”3 from 1982, Douwe Fokkema explains that Woolf’s novel The Waves “provides 
us with an exemplary demonstration of Modernist code.” (66) The modernist code, Fokkema 
clarifies, is made up of a number of complex linguistic strategies, of which the two most prolific 
are: The narrator’s awareness of his or her own “provisional [and] hypothetical nature” (69) as 
well as the hypothetical nature of both language and knowledge. By employing these ideas as 
narrative strategies, the modernist code encrypts information, in an effort to make the world 
strange so that the reader can rediscover and experience the world anew. Fokkema argues that 
the “[i]ntellectual” (71) themes of The Waves are overshadowed by the fact that the novel is a 
stylization of modernist code as such, which means that as soon as the code has been deciphered 
the novel does not offer much in terms of content that can successfully “attract readers” (66). 
The content in itself is not sufficiently estranging. My experience of The Waves, however, holds 
my attention beyond the novelty of its code. What is interesting is that even though Modernism 
is trying to break away from a false sense of objectivity by creating a code that is based on a 
structural subjectivity, Woolf is none the less trying to instil a sense of objective knowledge 
through fiction. Woolf’s modernist fiction is integrating both code and content in order to 
establish the boundary of knowledge in fiction. The possibility of knowledge in fiction, is that 
which has always intrigued me most in relation to fiction. Both Woolf and Bernard, both the 
                                                 
3 Fokkema, Douwe W. “A Semiotic Definition of Aesthetic Experience and the Period Code of 
Modernism.” Poetics Today 3.1 (1982): 61–79. Web. 
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code and content of The Waves, are engaged in a symbiotic discovery of the extent to which 
modernist fiction can create a world in which real knowledge is at stake.  
The American literary scholar Ann Banfield also believes that not only the code, but also 
the content of The Waves is worth investigating. Banfield is trying to establish how Woolf is 
using fiction to represent and engage the possibility of genuine objective value as a form of 
knowledge. In the book The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell and the Epistemology of 
Modernism (2000) Banfield delves into Woolf’s oeuvre and discovers that her innovative and 
experimental fiction is in fact a proper discussion of philosophical epistemology as such. 
According to Banfield, Woolf’s novels reveal a literary representation and discussion of the 
famous English philosopher Bertrand Russell’s epistemology. At the heart of Woolf’s fiction, 
she explains, there is an interest in representing Russell’s epistemology in order for fiction to 
gain value as a form of knowledge. Banfield lays out how Woolf’s modernist fiction can in fact 
teach the reader something new about the real world (Banfield, The Phantom Table 60).  
It is important to stress the fact, however, that Banfield does not only understand Woolf’s 
modernist fiction as capable of transferring knowledge as representation, but she rather sees 
fiction as an alternative to philosophical inquiry (The Phantom Table 383). This means that 
even though Banfield engages the epistemology of Modernism as a modernist representation of 
Russell’s epistemology, she also considers this form of fiction to partake in a certain, 
alternative, creation of knowledge. Banfield argue that Woolf, by using Russell’s epistemology, 
actually gives her fiction a proper logical structure and therefore creates knowledge. Banfield’s 
investigation raises a string of important questions, not only in relation to how fiction is able to 
represent epistemology, but also how representation as such is capable of creating a form of 
knowledge. In other words, Banfield is exploring what it is that Woolf does in The Waves and 
other novels that makes fiction epistemological. This does not mean that she believes that the 
knowledge at stake in modernist fiction is independent from a representation of philosophy. 
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Russell’s epistemology is crucial to Banfield’s reading of Woolf, which means that the 
knowledge at stake in The Waves necessarily refers back to Russell’s epistemological 
framework. I agree with Banfield in so far as the relationship between fiction and knowledge is 
at stake in modernist fiction, but as I see it, Woolf’s modernist fiction always does more than 
referring back to a specific philosophical discourse. Modernist authors were interested in the 
relationship between fiction and knowledge (Childs 21)4 and in The Waves it is possible to see 
this interest both as representation and, as I will argue later, a performance. In other words, by 
engaging and exploring Banfield’s argument in The Phantom Table I will be able to delve into 
what it means that there is epistemology at stake in The Waves. In order to do so I will examine 
what is being represented in The Waves, e.g. Bernard’s constant exploration for the potential of 
language, and I will continually question my own experience of the novel, which depends as 
much on the performance of the form as well as the content. I expect that by doing so, it is 
possible for me to define the way in which Woolf is relating representation and knowledge in 
The Waves and thereby define the relationship between Woolf’s modernist fiction and 
epistemology without referring back to Russell’s epistemology.  
I agree with Fokkema when he writes that it is as a stylisation of form, as a stylisation of 
modernist code, that The Waves at first attracts its attention. But my interest in The Waves stems 
from the inherent double and interrelated nature of code and content. The construction creates 
an experience of something more complete at stake in the novel. The experience of The Waves 
is difficult to classify and it holds more questions regarding the nature of knowledge and the 
relationship between knowledge and fiction than answers. I therefore disagree with Fokkema 
in so far as he believes that it is as a code that The Waves is most interesting and thereby also 
demands most attention. The questions relating to the possibility of representing knowledge as 
well as performing knowledge through language has kindled my interest in the novel and these 
                                                 
4 Childs, Peter. Modernism. New York: Routledge. 2008. Print.  
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factors have become the roots of the following exploration of Woolf’s The Waves and thereby 
Modernism. 
The question I will be exploring in this thesis pertains to Banfield’s reading of Woolf’s 
fiction. What is the epistemology of Modernism? Or in order to be more precise: How does 
modernist fiction relate to epistemology? My working hypothesis is that Woolf’s modernist 
fiction is referring back to epistemology, not primarily as a representation of Russell’s 
epistemology, but rather as an experience of knowledge, a form of fiction which is continually 
inscribing knowledge through the paradoxical nature of language.  
The exploration of the performance of knowledge at stake in The Waves is made up of 
three chapters. First, I begin by delving deep into Banfield’s analysis of Woolf’s fiction. It is 
an important place to start, in order to establish how fiction and knowledge is related through a 
representation of philosophy. Thereafter, in the second chapter, I will expand on Banfield’s 
analysis of epistemology by dividing the experience of fiction into representation and 
performance. In order to develop this argument, I approach fiction as a performance of 
knowledge and in order to elaborate how these performances of knowledge can be turned into 
practical readings of fiction I turn to three thinkers, Ernst van Alphen, Noël Carroll, and Dorthe 
Jørgensen, who try to approach and use thinking at stake in art and literature. In the third and 
final chapter, I will develop a new understanding of the knowledge at stake in The Waves by 
employing Gilles Deleuze’s epistemology and relating his ideas of event and series to fiction. I 
argue that fiction is made up of a number of series, of which all are made up of singular events. 
I argue that Deleuze’s empirical epistemology is a useful tool in conceptualising the knowledge 
at stake in the form of The Waves as well as in the content of the novel. I argue that modernist 
fiction proposes a different kind of knowledge than we are used to in the external world. A form 
of knowledge that is continually becoming. Woolf’s modernist fiction is an opportunity to 
articulate the epistemology of Modernism as a lived knowledge that is always becoming. In this 
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sense, modernist fiction is recreating the relationship between the individual and reality through 
fiction.  
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II – Epistemology in Woolf’s Modernism  
In her book The Phantom Table Banfield approaches the epistemology at stake in Modernism 
by focusing on the relationship between Woolf and Russell. Banfield argues that Woolf’s 
Modernism is an attempt to invent a new form of fiction. By employing Russell’s epistemology 
as a key to decipher the imagery and the novels’ form, Banfield argues that Woolf is translating 
philosophical principles into aesthetic principles and she thereby becomes capable of 
representing reality. Without engaging in a discussion of the problematic status of any a form 
of art which aspires to represent anything objectively, Banfield describes Woolf’s aspirations 
as a modernisation of fiction. Woolf’s experiments with form are attempts to write fiction that 
grasps the possibility of knowledge in fiction by offering an experience that has objective value 
rather than only focusing on representing the subjective world (Banfield, The Phantom Table 
59). It is necessary for Woolf to experiment with the possibilities in fiction, because modernist 
fiction was to her taste too narrowly focused on the subjective and private world of the writer 
instead of the reality of the external world (“Modern Fiction” 899)5. Banfield argues that Woolf 
develops Modernism from being an exercise in psychological impressionism to being an 
attempt at writing fiction that has actual objective and thereby cognitive value. By extending 
the possibilities at stake in modernist fiction, from only including the private and subjective 
world to also containing the public objective world, Woolf creates a form of fiction which 
relates to the reader in a new more totalising way (Banfield, The Phantom Table 334-5). 
According to Banfield, Woolf effectively bridges the gap between the clear, but fragmented 
knowledge of philosophy and science and the “blur of sense perception” pertaining to the 
singular experience (The Phantom Table 187). Woolf’s modernist fiction employs an imagery 
that represents Russell’s epistemology as well as a form that, Banfield argues, performs his 
epistemology. As a combination of performance and representation, Banfield understands 
                                                 
5 Woolf, Virginia. “Modern Fiction.” Modernism – An Anthology. Ed. Lawrence Rainey. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005. 897-901. Print.  
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Woolf’s fiction as something which has a clear and objective value and in effect produces 
objective knowledge. Banfield’s affirmation of cognition at stake in Woolf’s fiction, however, 
always depends on Russell’s philosophical work. And even though Banfield does recognise 
Woolf’s more independent aspirations in relation to philosophy, the epistemology of Modernism 
remains sterile in terms of an actual (alternative) process of thinking. In the following chapter 
I will investigate Banfield’s argument further, in order to establish whether or not it is possible 
to grasp the production of knowledge in The Waves as something more free and more creative 
than always referring back to Russell’s epistemology. In order to do so I will have to first start 
with uncovering the relation between thinking and Modernism.  
 
II – I Modernism  
Banfield defines modernist fiction as fiction that is closely related to epistemology. This is 
already made clear in the subtitle to her book The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry Russell and the 
Epistemology of Modernism. In order to grasp why it is necessary for Banfield to investigate 
the epistemology at stake in Woolf’s oeuvre, I will first lay out the way in which Modernism is 
traditionally understood.  
Peter Childs writes in his seminal work Modernism (2000) that “Modernism is variously 
argued to be a period, style, genre or combination of the above” (12) and he states that it is 
“impossible and undesirable to speak of a single ‘modernism’” (13). As Childs is trying to 
define Modernism in all its incarnations, he does not reduce his use of Modernism to either one 
definition or the other. He does award prominence, however, to the use of Modernism as either 
a time- and geography-bound movement, which started by the end of the 19th century and was 
over by 1930, mainly situated in the Anglo-Saxon world; or a genre-bound movement, defined 
by a set of stylistic devices used as a general response to the radical developments in science, 
philosophy and psychology in the late 19th and early 20th century (19, 37). The great anthology 
Andersen 12 
 
on modernist fiction and poetry, Modernism: an Anthology (2005)6 edited by Lawrence Rainey, 
similarly gives prominence to these two general interpretations of the modernist movement, as 
the anthology contains Anglo-Saxon writers of the period mentioned above and it is peppered 
with chapters called Continental Interlude’s, which is more a genre/style-bound choice. 
Collecting such a vast and polymorphous number of texts under one single predicate, is always, 
to a certain extent, a violent act toward the singularity of the text. But it is a necessary act if 
literary scholars are to be able to grasp fiction as a phenomenon that transgresses the particular 
text. It is, however, a necessity that Banfield submits to without elaborating further how she 
uses the predicate. The first question I have to attend to, therefore, is the relationship between 
Modernism and epistemology. 
The reduction that Banfield commits to, is a conceptualisation of Modernism that is, at 
its most basic, a reaction to a number of social-historical occurrences and a general 
problematisation of truth (The Phantom Table 17). These occurrences demand fiction to 
reassess its own relation to the external world and pay closer attention to the validity of 
knowledge. Childs explains that by the late 19th century authors start innovating and 
experimenting7 with the form and content of fiction, in order to write in a way that remains 
relevant in relation to the then most modern paradigms of knowledge (76). The developments 
in both philosophy (mainly that of William James, Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche) and 
psychology discredited the Enlightenment dream of relieving the subject from its ’self-induced 
ignorance.’ Philosophy and psychology do so by not recognising and undermining the 
independence of the subject and by the turn of the century the subject is no longer be considered 
as a sovereign entity (38). As a general response to this precarious condition for the subject, 
experimental modernist artists pose new ‘modern’ questions in fiction, e.g.: Is it possible to 
                                                 
6 Lawrence Rainey, ed. Modernism an Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 2005. Print.   
7 It is important to emphasise that, according to Childs, realist novels have always been, and still are, the 
single most popular genre in fiction. Realism sells much better than experimental literature even today and it is 
what is being most produced (Childs 3).  
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represent the world realistically? If so, how is one to do that? Modernism’s response to the 
scientific advances is to develop an alternative mode of representation that incorporates these 
questions. Modernism develops fiction that not only explores the boundaries of what is possible 
to represent in writing, but also fiction that investigates the boundaries of knowledge within a 
world without a fixed subject (Banfield, The Phantom Table 342-39). This development is only 
augmented by the disruption of the major epistemological frameworks of the Enlightenment. 
Christianity and physics are destabilised by Charles Darwin popularising evolutionary theory 
and Einstein introducing relativity at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th. 
Childs writes, that whereas Darwin’s theory of evolution exposes Christianity as an incoherent 
framework for understanding the world we live in, Einstein’s theory of relativity similarly 
discredits Newtonian physics and classical static mechanics as a valid interpretation of the 
external world. The epistemology of modernist fiction in the early 20th century, is a product of 
the general interest in establishing an alternative framework for knowledge which disregards 
the logocentrism of the Enlightenment. Modernism interprets these developments as a 
discreditation of realist fiction’s omniscient narrator. It responds by replacing the narrator’s 
former position as the text’s Archimedean point and Cartesian cogito with a more incomplete 
and subjective, but thereby also, according to the modernist writers, more real mode of 
narration (Banfield, The Phantom Table 59-60). The modernist response to these developments 
is to cultivate new narrative strategies. Traditionally modernist fiction has been considered to 
be a form of fiction that disregards the possibility of an objective representation of the external 
world (Banfield 60) and thereby foregrounding questions such as: “What is there to be known?; 
Who knows it?; How do they know it, and with what degree of certainty?” (McHale 9) 8. 
The American literary scholar Brian McHale elucidates further the way in which fiction 
can be ‘epistemological,’ by employing the idea of the ‘dominant’ from narratology, 
                                                 
8 McHale, Brian. Postmodernist Fiction. 1987. London: Routledge, 2001. Print. 
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popularised by the Russian literary theorist and linguist Roman Jakobson. In his book 
Postmodernist Fiction (1987) McHale writes that a ‘dominant’ is a tool, which  
specifies the order in which different aspects [of the text] are to be attended to, so that, 
although it would be perfectly possible to interrogate a postmodernist text about its 
epistemological implications, it is more urgent to interrogate it about its ontological 
implications. (11) 
By using the dominant as a tool, McHale defines the difference between the two literary 
movements (Modernism/Postmodernism) as a result of the urgency with which the reader 
engages the questions that the text poses. By using the concept of the dominant, it becomes 
clear that the Modernism Banfield discusses in The Phantom Table, is not defined by a set of 
relatively narrow stylistic devices or reduced to being texts that are produced at a certain point 
and place in history, but instead is fiction which has an intention in relation to the development 
of new modes of investigating epistemology.  
Banfield hopes to expand on McHale’s basic interpretation of Modernism by exploring 
how Woolf’s modernist fiction actually engages in epistemological considerations by 
attempting to reach an objective form of representation. In other words, she redefines the 
relationship between modernist fiction and epistemology as something which is not only 
contained in the form and content of the text. This is necessary as the relationship between 
Modernism and epistemology is an oft repeated fact (see: Childs, McHale, Douwe Fokkema), 
though without investigating the meaning of this statement in depth. How the text is 
foregrounding epistemology is engaged at length in The Phantom Table. Banfield is 
problematizing the ‘orthodox opinions’ on what Modernism epistemology is by evaluating 
Woolf’s philosophical considerations.  
In The Phantom Table, Banfield argues that it is necessary to depart from understanding 
Modernism as a stylisation of the subjective character of knowledge. Banfield argues, by 
introducing a Russellian epistemology and vocabulary, that Woolf moves beyond orthodox 
Modernism’s subjective ‘saturation of atoms’ (The Phantom Table 300), toward a more 
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objective form of fiction, which she hopes is able to truthfully represent the objective world 
(The Phantom Table 245). In other words, Banfield argues that Woolf experiments with the 
possibilities of narrative representation, not by accepting modern science’s criticism of 
objective knowledge, but instead by attempting to find ways to represent the objective world 
truthfully through the informed use of philosophy. What is at stake for Woolf, is the possibility 
to represent the objective world through fiction, she tries to do so by employing genuinely 
objective perspectives (“Modern Fiction” 899) and thereby using the form of her novels to 
create an objective representation of reality.  
Banfield explains that Woolf’s attempt toward a form of representation of objective 
reality that documents it truthfully, is keeping two important stylistic innovations attentively in 
mind. The first innovation, which is considered orthodox to Modernism, is the possibility of 
representing the private world without necessarily ‘locking’ the perspective to one single 
subject. Banfield uses To The Lighthouse (1927)9 to demonstrate this innovation. In To The 
Lighthouse James, the Ramsay’s youngest son, is caught daydreaming by the narrator. Woolf 
writes: “But whose foot was he thinking of, and in what garden did all this happen? For one 
had settings for these scenes; trees that grew there; flowers; a certain light; a few figures.” (To 
the Lighthouse 171) Banfield explains that the questions at stake in this text are James’ 
questions rather than the narrator’s questions, because 
the reader attributes the question to him and interprets “this” as pointing to something in 
his imaginary perspective. Such grammatically subjective terms and constructions like 
them are referred to the third person and represent its perspective. It is possible because 
there is no “I,” for when an “I” is added, e.g. “in what garden of mine did this all happen?,” 
it is no longer possible to interpret the sentence as his question. This novelistic third 
person becomes the name for the momentary subject, a reduced cogito “(s)he was 
thinking.” (The Phantom Table 315)  
Modernist fiction refuses to accept the possibility of an omniscient narrator that is so often 
employed in literary Realism, instead the text rather has to be understood through a limited 
                                                 
9 Woolf, Virginia. To The Lighthouse. London: Grafton Books, 1927 [1977]. Print.  
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number of point of view’s (Bal 149-55)10. Woolf’s narratives are characterised by employing 
focalisation as a method to highlight the private nature of knowledge. As Banfield writes, 
built into this shifting language is the possibility of multiple perspectives. Each sentence 
of represented thought linguistically represents a subject’s occupied perspective. Shifting 
from perspective to perspective, the novel’s language constructs a public world which 
“enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience” (The Phantom Table 
316).  
Private language without a subject, then, for Woolf, is a possibility to represent various 
particulars – or to use a Russellian vocabulary various sense-data – without needing to limit the 
representation to one single individual’s experience throughout (Banfield, The Phantom Table 
315). The second, and according to Banfield truly Woolfian innovation, is the possibility of 
creating a neutral environment for the occupied perspectives to unfold in. This environment 
comes about through representing unperceived perspectives. In To The Lighthouse, Banfield 
suggests, that the Time Passes chapter is an example of the unperceived perspectives and in The 
Waves it is the interludes (The Phantom Table 317). According to Banfield representing 
unperceived perspectives gives the text a structure which mirrors the logical form of reality 
(reality is here understood as Woolf’s interpretation of Russell’s epistemology), which is 
necessary in order to give a representation an objective character (The Phantom Table 321). 
The unperceived perspectives appear in The Waves as periodical interludes that break up the 
fabula: “The sun fell in sharp wedges inside the room. Whatever the became dowered with a 
fanatical existence. A plate was like a white lake. A knife looked like a dagger of ice.” (Woolf, 
The Waves 89) Banfield argues that the interludes are ‘unperceived,’ because the short chapters 
include no reference to a narrator or speaker. The quote is set in free indirect speech and 
Banfield argues that these inserts break off the story to give it logical form (The Phantom Table 
319-21, Unspeakable Sentences 185-9)11. The unoccupied perspectives of the short interludes, 
                                                 
10 Bal, Mieke. Narratology – Introduction to the theory of the narrative. 3rd Ed. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009. Print. 
11 Banfield, Ann. Unspeakable Sentences. London: Routledge, 1982. Print. 
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create the logically necessary neutral world within which the occupied perspectives are related 
to reality. Banfield argues that by employing these two stylistic devices Woolf achieves fiction 
which is objective, because, like Russell’s epistemology, there is the occupied perspective as 
well as an objective reality. Banfield writes, “Woolf’s aesthetic, while reserving a place for the 
personal, is itself impersonal.” (The Phantom Table 384) This means that Woolf’s investigation 
into the boundaries of knowledge, starts at the point where Modernism supposedly ends; in the 
subjectivity of the text. Woolf’s “world seen without a self” (Woolf, The Waves 239) 
transgresses the subjective world of the ‘I’ and claims to represent the world in a way that 
transgresses orthodox Modernism. 
The fact that Banfield proposes that Woolf’s texts are attempts at a more objective form 
of representation does not make the representations any more or less truthful. But the intention 
does raise several important questions. E.g. in what way is the experience of objective fiction 
different from the experience of subjective fiction?; and more importantly, what is the relation 
between representation and reality within a text that emulates the experience of reality? These 
questions are of epistemological nature, but there is one question which raises itself above 
others in relation to the overall interest of my investigation: To which extent does Banfield’s 
interpretation of Woolf’s new modernist fiction let Woolf’s fiction actually perform 
epistemology? I hope to clarify that Banfield’s understanding of Woolf’s fiction as being a 
representation of, in both form and content, Russell’s epistemology, is in fact shutting down all 
the possibilities of actual knowledge at stake in fiction in general.  
 
II – II Modern times and modern epistemology 
In the first chapter of The Phantom Table “Introduction: Table Talk,” Banfield makes an effort 
to introduce the various characters and the philosophical trends, which she considers to have 
lasting influence on Woolf’s philosophical outlook. The Bloomsbury Group, of course, gets a 
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lot of attention, but Banfield explains that it is necessary to look beyond the boundaries of the 
circle of Bloomsbury regulars in order to grasp Woolf’s philosophical and stylistic development 
(The Phantom Table 52).  
Banfield writes that Bloomsbury is what happened when “Cambridge philosophy moved 
to London” (The Phantom Table 8). What she means is that “in the formative years 1900 to 
1904-5 … Bloomsbury’s male members were Cambridge undergraduates” (The Phantom Table 
8) and as undergraduates the Bloomsbury men had the fortune to experience the “annus 
mirabilis for Cambridge philosophy, for in that year [1903] were published Russell’s Principles 
of Mathematics and Moore’s Principia Ethica” (The Phantom Table 9) as Banfield quotes 
Leonard Woolf for saying. But not only had these undergraduates from 1903 taken up residence 
in and around Bloomsbury in London by 1910. More importantly, also the three major 
Cambridge philosophers, Russell, Alfred North Whitehead and G. E. Moore made their way to 
London around those years. Together these three philosophers are important for the 
development of British philosophy of the 20th century and Banfield does not consider it a 
coincidence that the Bloomsbury group flourishes about the time the three philosophers arrived 
in London. Whitehead moved to London in 1910, Russell in 1911 and Moore lectured at the 
University College London in 1910-11 (Banfield, The Phantom Table 10). That Bloomsbury 
‘happened’ “when Cambridge came to London” (The Phantom Table 8), Banfield explains, has 
to be understood in a twofold manner. The reason is that it is not only the physical movement 
from Cambridge to London that was important, but also the modernisation and metropolisation 
of the isolated, classical, and elitist Cambridge philosophy is crucial (Banfield, The Phantom 
Table 23). The theoretical issues of Bloomsbury (as well as Moore, Russell and Whitehead’s 
issues), were modern issues. As Banfield writes: “It [The Home University Library of Modern 
Knowledge] defined “modern knowledge” as centrally mathematical, philosophical and 
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scientific, with an emphasis on physics and astronomy, … [i]t also included economics, 
evolution, socialism history and literature” (The Phantom Table 24). 
The influence of Cambridge philosophy on Bloomsbury, and by extension on Woolf, was 
massive, though at the same time she remained being inspired by the metropolitan and modern 
‘real world.’ Russell’s epistemological philosophy becomes, according to Banfield, crucial to 
Woolf’s philosophical development. “Russell,” Banfield quotes Clive Bell for writing, “though 
no one has ever called him ‘Bloomsbury,’ appeared to be a friend and was certainly an 
influence.” (The Phantom Table 41) The departure from Cambridge, the publications of Home 
University Library of Modern Knowledge and the modern, more egalitarian function of the 
University College London created an environment and an opening of philosophical discourse 
to women, the working class and other subaltern classes and individuals (Banfield, The 
Phantom Table 18). Being without formal education, Banfield explains, does not exclude Woolf 
from understanding the philosophical development of her time. Banfield fully expects Woolf 
to “know philosophy” and due to Cambridge’s physical transfer to London, she also expects 
Woolf to be well versed in the contemporary philosophical controversies and discussions of her 
day (The Phantom Table 30-1).  
In the second chapter: “The geometry in the sensible world: Russell’s analysis of matter”, 
Banfield delves into Russell’s epistemology from 1910-19 (The Phantom Table 64). She does 
so in order to demonstrate to which extent Russell’s epistemology has influenced the 
philosophical project in Woolf’s fiction.  
Let me start by introducing Banfield’s understanding of Russell’s influence on Woolf’s 
oeuvre, before laying out the critical characteristics of Russell’s epistemology anno 1910-18. 
Banfield explains that Woolf employs several recurring images in her fiction that echo Russell’s 
epistemology. These images partake, directly or indirectly, in the discourse surrounding 
Russell’s discussion of the role of sensation in relation to knowledge. In other words, Banfield 
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interprets a number of images in Woolf’s novels as direct representations of Russellian 
philosophy (see: The Phantom Table, chapter 3). Amongst the many examples that Banfield 
summons, is the private world of the room – cut off from the public world – the most significant. 
In The Waves Woolf presents the Louis’ room as such a privately accessible haven.  
’Yet I still keep my attic room. There I open the usual little book; there I watch the rain 
glisten on the tiles till they shine like a policeman’s waterproof; there I see the broken 
windows in poor people’s houses; the lean cats; some slattern squinting in a cracked 
looking-glass as she arranges her face for the street corner there Rhoda sometimes comes. 
(Woolf, The Waves 140) 
Banfield writes that when Woolf uses the private room it is “impenetrable to the observer” (The 
Phantom Table 12). Louis’ attic room is such an impenetrable and safe private space. To Louis, 
his attic room is a place where he is in total control of his own identity. He is first observing the 
neighbour, then the street. Louis’ private attic room is, therefore, a representation of the privacy 
and singularity of sense perception. Juxtaposed to the privacy of a room, there is the public 
perspective of a shared dinner table (Banfield, The Phantom Table 120). The dinner table is a 
recurring image in Woolf’s fiction as well as in The Waves. Banfield argues, that rooms and 
tables are representations of Russell’s understanding of the private perspective (The Phantom 
Table 111), as opposed to the possibility of a public and objective perspective (The Phantom 
Table 120). “The privately localized and temporalized reduced subjectivity receives an 
objectivity” (Banfield, The Phantom Table 78) in the public sphere. At the first dinner in The 
Waves the six speakers are comparing their individual experiences of their youth.  
‘The leaf danced in the hedge without anyone to blow it,’ said Jinny. 
‘In the sun-baked corner,’ said Louis, ‘the petals swam on depths of green.’ 
‘At Elvedon the gardeners swept and swept with their great brooms, and the woman at a 
table writing,’ said Bernard.  
In this way, at the dinner table the individual private perspectives, the childhood memories, 
receive a sense of objectivity as the stories of youth are shared and verified in the public space 
around the table. The speakers are sharing the individual experiences of youth and by the dinner 
table they become factual, as the private perspective is tested and validated in the common. The 
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recurring presence of private rooms and public dinner tables throughout Woolf’s novels are, 
according to Banfield, representations of Russell’s epistemology and his theory of the private, 
and subjective, perspective of sense-data and the public and therefore objective, possibly 
unobserved sensibilia (Banfield, The Phantom Table 106-7). Banfield acknowledges and 
describes many other minor examples of Russellian theory in Woolf’s writing (The Phantom 
Table 123).  
It is, however, important to also let it be known that Banfield believes Woolf’s imagery 
to, at certain stages, transgress Russell’s philosophy (The Phantom Table 245). Banfield 
explains that the images and clues that are spread throughout Woolf’s novels partake in a 
discussion of Russell’s epistemology. She writes that it is possible for modernist fiction to 
transgress the fragmented nature of science and the arching nature of philosophy (The Phantom 
Table 245), because Woolf combines the “[p]ure seeing,” which “is detached from use” 
(Banfield, The Phantom Table 265) and it is subjective and particular, as well as it utilises the 
bare ‘granite’ of true logical form (Banfield, The Phantom Table 287). By doing so Woolf 
represents “the logical possibility of unoccupied perspectives” (Banfield, The Phantom Table 
293). Banfield states that this form of representation places Modernism a step further than 
science and philosophy. Banfield writes: 
The ordinary and the analytical mind are the negation one of the other. One is rambling, 
vague, illogical, opens itself indiscriminately to the unpredictableness of sense-data but 
ultimately detaches itself from the immediate … The other is sterile, precise, rigorous, 
formal, breaks things down into discrete units and orders them. The two classes of mind 
are … mutually exclusive (The Phantom Table 192). 
Woolf’s fiction is transgressing the limitations of both the analytical positions of science and 
philosophy and the subjective perspective of the ordinary mind. In other words, the sterile 
analytical approach of science, pertaining to the particulars, and philosophy, pertaining to the 
arching statements about the reality of things, are according to Banfield all transgressed in 
Woolf’s fiction. Banfield understands Woolf’s fiction as an investigation into the particular 
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table without it being a table of actual physical characteristics. Hence the name of her book: 
The Phantom Table.  
In order to appreciate the, at first glance, imaginative scope of Banfield’s project in The 
Phantom Table, it is necessary to develop a better understanding of Russell’s epistemology and 
the possibility of unoccupied perspectives. Banfield writes that Russell’s interest in 
epistemology was surging around the time Russell and Whitehead published Principia 
Mathematica (1910). Being exhausted by the strict reason of an ideal purely mathematical logic 
(Banfield, The Phantom Table 10-1), Russell departed from abstract discussion of ideas to 
engage the particulars of everyday life. The particulars of everyday life do not only remain 
important in the work that Russell performs in the decade following Principia Mathematica, 
the particulars of everyday life pushes Russell to adapt to a naturalistic epistemology (Kitchener 
130)12. Richard F. Kitchener attempts to deepen the understanding of Russell’s epistemology 
in the 1910’s by explaining why Russell is adapting to a naturalistic epistemology. Kitchener 
writes:  
Throughout Russell’s many writings on epistemology, two different conceptions of 
epistemology can be found. On the one hand, there is a more traditional Cartesian account 
of the nature and task of epistemology: according to this conception, the primary task of 
epistemology is to answer the sceptic and to show that knowledge is possible by showing 
that we do have certain, indubitable knowledge. … Alongside this traditional concern of 
epistemology, however, there is another, quite different conception of epistemology to be 
found in Russell – a NE [Naturalistic Epistemology]. (133) 
It is Russell’s naturalistic epistemology, which Banfield argues that Woolf is representing (The 
Phantom Table 64). A naturalistic epistemology does not investigate the possibility of a 
knowledge of the external world. Naturalistic epistemology rather investigates the relationship 
between the particulars of the external world to the individual. Kitchener argues, that by 
implementing a naturalistic epistemology, Russell departs from the theoretical realm of pure 
philosophy, which for Russell means a realm of analytical philosophy, in order to take part in 
                                                 
12 Kitchener, Richard F. “Bertrand Russell’s Naturalistic Epistemology.” Philosophy 82.01 (2007): 115-
146. Web. 
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an epistemology based on the particulars in the experiences of life (134). Particulars are the raw 
singular facts, but these singular entities always pose problems for the philosopher. Banfield 
writes, that when the philosopher rejects idealism, then the philosopher is stuck with the “blur 
of reality” (The Phantom Table 187). Russell’s naturalistic epistemology is, at the outset, an 
epistemology which has rejected idealism, but still seeks order in the blur of reality. Russell 
intends to harness the blur of sensation, by developing an epistemology founded on a frame of 
logic (Banfield, The Phantom Table 83). Banfield writes that to Russell “[u]niversals and forms 
constitute the “logical foundation” of knowledge.” … “Logic is necessary to it … because it 
gives a completer reality” (The Phantom Table 83). This means that within Russell’s 
epistemology the world is made out from a number of particulars, that are organised within a 
logical structure.  
This worldview results in a division which Banfield considers of critical importance to 
Woolf’s fiction. Russell makes a division between the private singular experience of sense-data 
and the objectivity of the logical necessary unperceived sense-data which he calls sensibilia 
(Banfield, The Phantom Table 71). A sense-datum is the subject’s sensual experience of a 
physical object. It is the perception of white when something white presents itself to the eye, or 
it is the perception of the sun’s yellowness. Sense-data are per definition private and they form 
the window in the private room – the relation between private world and the public world. To 
Russell, perception is a common-sense proof of our own place in the external world and our 
everyday interactions with it. Sense-data are, in other words, the reason why we consider 
ourselves a part of the external world, as Banfield quotes Russell for writing: “Physics exhibits 
sense-data as functions of physical objects” (The Phantom Table 68). Sensibilia, however, are 
different from sense-data, because a sensibile is a physical object’s theoretical characteristic 
without the object being sensed by a subject. As sensibilia have not been perceived by senses, 
but still are considered to have theoretical reality, they are real outside the singular perception. 
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Sensibilia is the logical form, a form Banfield argues to be repeated in Woolf’s fiction. 
Understood in this way, sense-data of a table do not exist independently of the sensing subject, 
but the sensibilia of tables are always logically necessary. Sensibilia are the real world without 
the perceiving subject (Banfield, The Phantom Table 70-1).  
The distinction between sense-data and sensibilia is important, because it creates the 
logical possibility of an objective reality outside sensual perception. Russell thereby affirms the 
existence of an objective reality, which is impossible to access for the subject, but none the less 
logically exists. Banfield argues that Woolf is attempting to transform Modernism from 
wallowing in its own inability to represent anything objectively and employing extreme 
subjective forms of representation, toward representing objective reality in itself. Woolf does 
so by representing the logical form of Russell’s epistemology through the unperceived 
perspectives and she is filling this logical space with the occupied perspectives. In The Waves, 
Banfield argues, what is being represented in the story, gains a form of permanence outside the 
experience of it. The objective is obtained through form, and that is what The Waves is all about 
(The Phantom Table 384). The novel is an experiment in giving objective reality to fiction 
through a performance of Russell’s logical form. Banfield argues that Woolf uses her 
knowledge of philosophy in order to attempt to create an objective reality out of fiction.  
In The Waves the narrator presents the lives of the six friends, Bernard, Susan, Louis, 
Neville, Rhoda and Jinny. The reader meets these six characters through a number of 
soliloquies. In order for the reader to navigate through these internal monologues, the external 
narrator offers short and concise: “said Susan” or “said Neville” at the beginning of each new 
soliloquy. In the first meeting with the six speakers it already becomes clear that the narrator is 
describing the experiences and perceptions of each character:  
‘I see a ring’ said Bernard, ‘hanging above me. It quivers and hangs in a loop of light.’  
‘I see a slab of pale yellow,’ said Susan, ‘spreading away until it meets a purple stripe.’ 
‘I hear a sound,’ said Rhoda, ‘cheep, chirp; cheep chirp; going up and down.’  
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‘I see a globe,’ said Neville, ‘hanging down in a drop against the enormous flans of some 
hill.’ 
‘I see a crimson tassel,’ said Jinny, ‘twisted with gold and threads.’ 
‘I hear something stamping,’ said Louis. ‘A great beast’s foot is chained. It stamps, and 
stamps, and stamps.’ (Woolf, The Waves 5)  
The story unfolds through six independent points of view, only with a minimum of interjections 
by the narrator. This results in the reader gaining access to the story, through six widely diverse 
worlds and diverse perceptions of reality. Interrupting these singular points of view, are short 
chapters that are set entirely in an italic font. These interludes are the short descriptions of a 
beach throughout the day, while paying close attention to the sun crossing the sky. The novel 
begins in medias res in an interlude with: “The Sun had not yet risen.” (Woolf, The Waves 3) 
Similarly the novel ends in a short interlude stating: “And the waves broke on the shore.” 
(Woolf, The Waves 248) In this sense, the interludes are physically framing the story and 
according to Banfield the interludes form a logical scaffolding that is holding the catalogue of 
private perspectives together throughout the novel. The interludes and the story are not 
explicitly related with each other (though there are references throughout the story of a woman 
sitting at the speakers’ childhood home in Elvedon writing (Woolf, The Waves 12), it is never 
stated explicitly related to the narrator) in terms of content. According to Banfield the interludes 
attempts at representing the world of sensibilia and the story is made up of sense-data through 
the subjective soliloquies. As I explained earlier, sensibilia are the logically necessary form of 
the external world. As a frame, it is possible to understand sensibilia as that which is not focused 
on by the speakers. What each of the characters are describing, is then their own individual 
experience of reality. In this sense, following Banfield’s argument in The Phantom Table, each 
speaker is representing sense-data.  
 
II – III Woolf’s Modernism according to Banfield 
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The Waves is, Banfield argues, the climax of Woolf’s attempts toward a “new modernism” (The 
Phantom Table 387). It succeeds in creating vivid sensual representation, a “picture book” and 
“art of the eye” (Banfield, The Phantom Table 257), and the interludes of the theoretically 
possible ‘unperceived perspectives’ create a geometrical skeletal structure that gives the novel 
“surface weight” and gives fiction an objective nature (Banfield, The Phantom Table 280). The 
Waves is a product of Russellian thought and Banfield specifically understands the novel as 
Woolf’s best attempt toward a new ‘objective Modernism.’ ‘New Modernism,’ however, is not 
to be misunderstood as a different project than Modernism as such – understood as fiction that 
investigates the boundaries of knowledge – instead the term ‘new’ signifies a different point of 
departure for epistemology. Banfield shows that Woolf gives the performance of fiction an 
objective basis, but she is unwilling to discuss how the experience of this objective fiction 
creates a different foundation for objective knowledge. The objective world is simply there and 
together with Russell, she is unwilling to perform further investigations of it. Instead Woolf 
insists on attempting to map the boundaries of the external world in relation to a private 
knowledge. Banfield argues that Woolf is able to escape the privacy of the mind, by 
implementing Russell’s epistemology as a narrative strategy. The narrative style lets the author 
escape the privacy of the individual. The strategy is to a large degree literary adaptions of Roger 
Fry’s critique of the impressionist and post-impressionist movement (Banfield, The Phantom 
Table 247-8). Banfield writes: “Fry combined the eye and eyelessness, color and skeletal form.” 
(The Phantom Table 249) Inspired by Fry, Woolf establishes a writing style which is closely 
related to the epistemological questions that were developed by analytical philosophy. ‘The eye 
and skeletal form’ relate to Russell’s inquiries into the private subjective perception of the world 
and the public skeletal logic of the worlds facts and propositions. Sense-data make up our being 
in the world, the colours and contours of impressionism is the indiscriminate representation of 
sense-data. Sense-data are, however, products of the subject’s meeting with the logically 
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necessary external world of sensibilia. In this sense there is an objective – public – world behind 
the sense-data of perception. The objective world of sensibilia is made up in a skeletal logical 
form (Banfield, The Phantom Table 255). The subject is then not related with that which is 
represented, as the use of the logical structure of sensibilia in a representational investigation 
of the world, validates the private perspectives. As Banfield writes: “art is more than a picture 
of appearances. … It is a directly apprehendable pattern” (The Phantom Table 256). To 
investigate the boundaries of a public knowledge, Woolf’s ‘new modernist’ fiction attempts to 
fit the private world of sense-data into an objective representation, by employing a clear skeletal 
form. Banfield argues that Woolf’s novels continually represent the unperceived perception, de 
facto representing something unobserved. Thereby Woolf represents the public world without 
referring to the authority of the narrator.  
To Banfield, therefore, there is a close relation between Modernism and the process of 
creating knowledge of the external world because of its involvement with Russell’s 
epistemology. This is of relevance because if fiction not only represents epistemological 
discussions, but also performs epistemology, a form of epistemology which is different from 
both science and philosophy, Woolf’s Modernism can in this sense help to gain a better 
understanding of the relationship between fiction, knowledge, and sense perception. Maybe 
Woolf’s fiction occupies the centre of a triangle of knowledge. A triangle which has one leg 
occupied by science, the other occupied by philosophy, and the last occupied by common sense. 
If Woolf’s new Modernism performs knowledge, it performs neither of the three and it will 
never be reduced to only two. Instead Woolf’s fiction occupies a position in the middle.  
In the following chapter I will investigate this claim further. I will establish how 
knowledge and fiction are related in Woolf’s fiction according to Banfield. Banfield argues that 
Woolf’s fiction depends on a style that transgresses the individual, desires, opinions, 
perspective, and even death – Woolf’s fiction transforms into “a free art’s worship” that 
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“records the world as it is” (The Phantom Table 388). Is this ‘Modern elegy’ an investigation 
of the limits of knowledge, or does Banfield unknowingly depart from her initial goal, namely 
defining epistemology at stake in Modernism.  
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III – Performing fiction and the act of thinking   
In the previous chapter I discussed the concept of Modernism and Banfield’s conceptualisation 
of Woolf’s new Modernism. In this chapter I will develop Banfield’s reading further by 
critically engaging instances of knowledge at stake in her book, which are better understood as 
performances of epistemological reflection rather than representation. This will help me to gain 
a better understanding of what it means that Modernism foregrounds epistemology. The 
question I am getting at and hope to expand upon in this chapter is: What is the nature of the 
‘epistemology’ which is believed to pertain to modernist fiction and how does it translate into 
knowledge?  
Epistemology is in essence a branch of philosophy that deals with the theory of 
knowledge. In broad terms, epistemology is a theory about how belief is justifiably designated 
as knowledge. But as a branch of philosophy, epistemology relates to knowledge in different 
ways. In his discussion of Russell’s epistemology, Kitchener makes a clear distinction between 
‘internal’ epistemology and ‘naturalistic’ epistemology (136). The difference between the two 
branches of epistemology is a difference on the level of theory. Whereas internal epistemology 
engages the theoretical conditions for knowledge as such, naturalistic epistemology understands 
our private beliefs to already be knowledge and they are the point of departure for reflecting on 
questions pertaining to the justification of science. To naturalistic epistemology “knowing is a 
natural state in the world” (Kitchener 136). The fact that knowledge is a natural state of being, 
changes the emphasis of an epistemological investigation from a theoretical consideration over 
the nature of knowledge itself, to a consideration regarding the intricate relation between the 
private knowledge of the sensed reality and a possibility for objective knowledge. As mentioned 
earlier, Russell’s shift toward a naturalistic epistemology in the 1910’s, coincides with his 
influence on Woolf’s philosophical attitude (Banfield, The Phantom Table 34). Following 
Banfield argument, it means that Woolf’s fiction is not an investigation of the intrinsic, and 
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highly technical, possibilities of knowledge in itself, but rather the relation between the private 
knowledge of the external world, as we experience it through our senses, to an objective 
knowledge (The Phantom Table 298). In this sense, Banfield argues, the ‘epistemology’ 
belonging to Woolf’s Modernism is a naturalistic epistemology and when Woolf employs an 
experimental form in The Waves, it is because she hopes the novel’s framework to mimetically 
represent that of the world in Russell’s epistemology.  
I will now try to engage Banfield’s argument further and explore the consequences of 
understanding fiction as primarily a representation of a philosophical system, and how this 
understanding influences the instances of thinking that Banfield performs in the reading of 
Woolf’s texts. I will in this chapter investigate the consequences of Banfield’s analysis in order 
to explore how knowledge can be said to be at stake in The Waves as such. I will, in other words, 
explore and criticise Banfield’s use of Russell’s philosophy and develop and suggest an 
alternative understanding of the epistemology of Modernism.  
 
III – I Representations- and performances of epistemology 
Throughout The Phantom Table, Banfield is defining Modernism as a movement that uses 
fiction to mimetically represent (Russell’s) epistemology. To Banfield, Woolf’s Modernism is 
a narrative ‘showing’ of Russellian epistemology. Understood in this way, Banfield does not 
consider Woolf’s representation to contain a cognitive object, because a philosophical system 
is being represented, it is not a genuine performance of a cognitive process. A large part of The 
Phantom Table is directly related with considerations of representations of epistemological 
questions. The chapter “The world seen without a self: Woolf’s analysis of matter” (The 
Phantom Table 108-59) confirms a catalogue of images that iconically represent Russellian 
ideas, and in the chapter “How describe a world seen without a self” (The Phantom Table 294-
358) Banfield argues that Woolf’s stylistic innovation is a representation of Russellian 
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epistemology through form, which is a symbolic form of representation. The dissection that 
Banfield performs in these two chapters, exposes an intimate dependency on representation 
between Woolf’s work and Russell’s epistemology. Understanding Modernism as a 
representation of epistemology transforms the text into a series of complex allegories, which 
all can be deciphered through a comparative analysis between philosophy and fiction: the house 
represents the possibility of an objective world, and distant sounds represent the subjective 
registration of objective atoms, the private worlds of individuals relate to the objective world 
of unseen perspectives etc. (Banfield, The Phantom Table 108–55).  
I consider this analysis in The Phantom Table to be successful, as Banfield convincingly 
argues that Russell’s epistemology is an important framework for interpreting what is at stake 
at the level of representation in Woolf’s fiction. Even though it might be of historical and 
biographical importance, considering fiction as a representation of a certain strain of thought is 
a dangerous reduction of the multifaceted nature of modernist fiction. It is a reduction, however, 
which enables Banfield to expose a historically important connection between Russell and his 
philosophy and Woolf and her fiction. But if we are to understand the representation of 
Russell’s epistemology to be the ‘epistemology of Modernism’ as such, it becomes a negative 
reduction. If Woolf’s fiction, and Modernism in general, is primarily a representation of a 
philosophical discourse, then Woolf’s novel’s lose their multifaceted framework and their 
relation to thinking. In the sense that Banfield proposes to read Woolf, modernist fiction is 
nothing more than an illustrated ‘user manual’ for philosophical epistemology and it has no 
relation to the practical endeavour the process of cognition is. This is a dangerous reduction of 
what is at stake in Woolf’s fiction. In order to grasp the consequence of such a position, it is 
necessary to explore how representation transfers knowledge.  
As a representation of epistemology the text transfers knowledge by ‘showing’ 
philosophy. This means that Modernism reduces the text to be an allegory, which, in a different 
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way than philosophy proper, is demonstrating what (Russell’s) epistemology is. If fiction is 
understood through allegory, the experience of fiction loses its ability to add anything original 
to the world, because allegory always ultimately refers back to the intention of the author, or 
the intention of the reader. Understanding Modernism as an allegorical representation of 
epistemology is then reducing the possibility of modernist fiction to add anything in relation to 
the world in terms of independent and truly new forms of thinking. The notion of an all-
powerful author, able to exhaustively represent the world, let alone philosophy, is one of the 
ideologies of fiction, which modernist fiction effectively is trying to disband (see previous 
chapter) by implementing less authorative narrative strategies. The idea of a reader 
implementing allegories for the sake of an external argument is equally detrimental for the 
singularity of the experience of fiction in general. The nature of modernist fiction disavows any 
external manifestations of a subject being able to read in one dominant way. Modernist fiction 
has integrating the reader’s subjective position, in order to act out knowledge instead of defining 
one ‘knowledge.’ It is necessary to explore this performative side of modernist fiction further, 
in order to grasp the epistemology of Modernism anew. By exploring the epistemology of 
Modernism as something which in itself is a multifaceted experience, both a performance and 
representation, I will be able to accommodate modernist fiction’s struggle against authority, as 
well as specifying what its claim to knowledge is. The fact that Banfield reduces important 
aspects of Woolf’s oeuvre, both form and content, to being a consequence of an urge to 
represent strictly external philosophical considerations, results in a dominating reading that 
goes against the nature of Modernism’s anti-authority nature. Apart from just philosophical 
consideration there are equally always considerations of social, historical and literary 
developments at stake in fiction. I will now emphasise a less narrow interpretation of the way 
in which Modernism relates to epistemology. I consider this interpretation of Modernism to be 
related with the moments in The Phantom Table, where Banfield transgresses considerations of 
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representation and states that Woolf’s fiction is emulating Russell’s through form (The 
Phantom Table 277).  
The Greek literary scholar Stathis Gourgouris liberates fiction from relating to knowledge 
through representation in the book Does Literature Think? (2003)13. To Gourgouris fiction is 
in itself a process of thinking and he attempts to describe how the processual nature of fiction 
changes its relation to knowledge. Gourgouris argues that when the reader reads fiction an event 
occurs in the act of reading – the text is being performed. It is a performance because fiction 
contains an intrinsic performativity that is actualised in every reading of the text regardless of 
the content (Gourgouris 43). Though I will not discuss Gourgouris’ project in detail, as it mostly 
delves into the relation between the social-historical performance of myth, my investigation 
follows a similar trajectory to the one he lays out in the following:  
[L]et us consider the claim of literature’s intrinsic theoretical capacity to be a 
performative matter, a matter of (re)framing the conditions of action and perception 
within a shifting social-historical terrain, which renders one’s relation to the object of 
knowledge a process (praxis) of restlessness and transformation. In this respect, 
literature’s theoretical praxis makes the classic dichotomy between vita activa and vita 
contemplative no longer applicable. … [S]o literature’s aim to knowledge cannot be 
reduced to an object that could be externally determined and circumscribed. (11) 
Gourgouris defines the performance of fiction as a simultaneously practical as well as active 
process of thinking. Fiction is thereby a mode of thought that continually inscribes knowledge 
in experience of it, through the “text’s conditions of production [e.g.] … historical context, 
linguistic idiom, cultural tradition, biographical parameters, and so on,” (Gourgouris 11). 
Gourgouris specifies that these conditions of production, both those of origin (and here I mean 
specific to the time in which the piece was written) and the instance of textual performance, 
should “be considered, not external to the text, but internal to the overall process” (11). 
Understood in this way, fiction is an assemblage of performance and representation, a 
compound being that gives rise to experience, which both encompasses the creative moment of 
                                                 
13 Gourgouris, Stathis. Does Literature Think? Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. Print.  
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its historical production as well as the moment of reading. The performance is, as an event, 
always singular, but at the same time, because of the actual text’s material timelessness and 
historical origin, also a transgression of singularity. In her analysis of Woolf’s fiction, Banfield 
only emphasises the representational layer of fiction.  
Gourgouris understanding of what is at stake in fiction, offers an alternative 
conceptualisation of the epistemology that pertains to Modernism. As a performance, modernist 
fiction not only foregrounding questions of epistemology, because the way in which these 
questions are being foregrounded means that they are also being performed – modernist fiction 
is performing epistemology. In other words, modernist fiction is a form of fiction that is 
establishing a form of epistemology as its cognitive object. In this sense Modernism seizes to 
be a representation of a certain system of thought – a certain epistemology – by instead 
becoming a praxis – a practical explorative mode of thought. Understanding, as Banfield does, 
Modernism’s epistemology to mimetically represent a finalised body of thought, is a significant 
reduction of the possibilities in modernist fiction. The epistemology of Modernism should 
rather be considered to be a process of reflecting on epistemological questions, a process of 
relating the private knowledge of the external world to a public knowledge. This relation 
between epistemology and Modernism confirms a more diverse interaction between fiction and 
thought than what mere representation can transfer.  
This alternative understanding of Modernism, demands to shift the analytical emphasis 
from that which is being represented through form or content, toward an investigation of the 
text as a compound of performance and representation. In other words, the analytical object 
should be the meeting between the reader and the text, rather than what the author intended 
when writing the text. In order to explore the idea that fiction performs thinking as well as 
represents thinking, I intend to follow Gourgouris example and investigate the production of 
knowledge in the experience of fiction. I believe that by doing so, it will become possible to 
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approach the epistemology of Modernism as it is being represented and performed. In other 
words, I will follow the argument that Banfield presents in The Phantom Table, but I will take 
it beyond the question of how the text represents in order to ask how it performs.  
The performative character of fiction, Gourgouris explains, ultimately stems from the 
creative process – ‘Poiesis.’ Poiesis “does not work by putting forward a definite project to be 
organized and instituted in some specified future; it works indefinitely and infinitely both 
because it is irreducible to its parts (that is, singular) but also because it is interminable 
reproducible each time anew.” (Gourgouris 43) The creative process is continually producing 
the artwork anew. Banfield’s interpretation of Woolf’s oeuvre for example, is equally a creative 
process as well as that of Gourgouris. Poiesis, in other words, is the concept Gourgouris uses 
to designate the assemblage of representation and performance at stake in fiction. In The 
Phantom Table Banfield’s analysis of Woolf’s fiction goes beyond the text itself, she also uses 
Poiesis, or the experience of fiction, as a more practical mode of thinking. These performances 
are problematic, because Banfield’s warrant is based on Woolf’s fiction representing 
philosophy. In the final chapter, “The Modern Elegy,” Banfield explores the boundaries of 
modern (contemporary) knowledge and she writes that: “The limits [of knowledge] appear also 
in the problem of transcription, of converting a private, incommunicable acquaintance into a 
transmittable knowledge by description.” In this dense discussion of the possibilities of 
knowledge in modern society (of which the quote serves as an example), Banfield refers back 
to Russell’s epistemology. This means that the process of modern thinking, which Banfield 
believes to uncover in Woolf’s fiction is defined by an epistemology that Russell already 
departed from around 1918 which is problematic in itself (Banfield, The Phantom Table 382-
3). In the following I will try to make it more clear how Banfield’s performance of 
epistemology, her genuine investigation into the value of fiction in relation to knowledge, is 
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problematical because of her theoretical framework. I will do so by giving her reading of form 
in The Waves a closer look. 
In chapter 7: “How describe the world without a self?” (The Phantom Table 294-357), 
Banfield specifies that The Waves is an experimental attempt at a truthful representation of the 
objective world. She argues that Woolf attempts to create a representation of the objective world 
by experimentally employing the Russellian difference between private and public world, the 
difference between sense-data and sensibilia, in the novel. Banfield conceptualises the 
kaleidoscopic soliloquies as representations of individual psychological and subjective 
‘perspectives’ and their corresponding sense-data (The Phantom Table 308–9). Regardless of 
their content, the soliloquies offer private perspectives and per definition private knowledge. 
These intrinsically private perspectives are in the interludes exchanged with the theoretically 
possible, neutral, unperceived perspectives. According to Banfield, Woolf uses the unperceived 
perspectives in order to give the soliloquies a relation to an objective reality. This means that 
Banfield believes that Woolf’s use of innovative language and form in The Waves is more a 
further representation of Russell’s epistemology than a way in which epistemology is being 
performed. The interludes, she argues, give the private perspectives of the six speakers a 
relation to a neutral objectivity - “The unobserved thus finds in the novel a “neutral monist” 
language.” (Banfield, The Phantom Table 318) The interludes create a logical framework and 
thereby continuity between the subjective sense-data, and the interludes employ the “images of 
sensibilia and erect them into an explicit formal expression of the geometry of the external 
world.” (Banfield, The Phantom Table 147) In other words, Banfield uses the theoretical 
possibility of unperceived perspectives in Russell’s epistemology as a formal innovation, which 
creates fiction that not only represents philosophy, but also gives the novel an ‘objective 
reality.’  
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I will try to elucidate why this is a somewhat problematic interpretation of the form of 
The Waves. The second interlude begins as follows:  
The sun rose higher. Blue waves, green waves swept a quick fan over the beach, circling 
the spike of sea-holly and leaving shallow pools of light here and there on the sand. A 
faint black rim was left behind them. The rocks which had been misty and soft hardened 
and were marked with red clefts. (Woolf, The Waves 21) 
First off, the interlude does not necessarily represent a neutral description. If the snippet is read 
independent from Banfield’s analysis on Woolf and Russell, it is possible to read it as a 
description of a sun-rise, without questioning if it actually represents a perceived perspective 
or not. In Russellian terms, the interlude could just as well be a representation of sense-data as 
sensibilia as the narrator, though explicitly withdrawn from the text, is still describing the sun, 
sea and beach. However, if I am to follow the logic of Banfield’s argument, the passage is an 
attempt at representing unperceived perspectives, an attempt that gives the novel a logical form, 
a form that qua its form represents the experience of the real world. In this sense, the non-
perceptible narrator is ‘showing’ the world, mimicking the method of the camera, before the 
narrator highlights various landscape features, first zooming in on this – “shallow pools of light” 
– then zooming in on that – “the rocks which had been misty.” Banfield argues that it is the lack 
of pronouns, the few adverbs and the fact that the interlude remains in the past tense, that gives 
the description an objective character (Banfield, Unspeakable Sentences 185–6). The distance 
gives a sense of being “neither ‘egocentric’ or ‘subject-centred’ because [they occur] in contexts 
with no first- or third-person pronouns” (Banfield, The Phantom Table 317). The interlude is 
motivated by an attempt to reach an objective representation of the external world by 
implementing a logically necessary ‘empty space’ in the narrative (Banfield, The Phantom 
Table 277).  
It is curious, however, that Banfield insists on viewing the interlude as an ‘objective’ or 
‘neutral’ empty space, because the interlude does not escape committing the landscape to 
description. “Description” Mieke Bal writes “is a privileged site of focalization, and as such it 
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has a great impact on the ideological and aesthetic effect of the text.” (35) Bal argues that 
descriptions are never able to obtain complete neutrality, a fact that the modernist authors were 
well aware of in their critique of Realism (see chapter 1). The neutral gaze, independent as it is 
from pronouns, explicit subjects, and narrators, does always submit the gazed upon to an (often 
arbitrarily motivated) rhetoric (Bal 45). The rhetoric of the interlude is a rhetoric of disinterested 
interest. It is the rhetoric of an observer having the time and eye for observing nature for its 
own sake. This mode of description, however, leaves out a number of other features of the 
landscape. The narrator does not commit the land to the scrutiny of domination or the need to 
meet production quotas. Disengaging nature from the means of survival, e.g. disregarding 
thousands of years of agriculture and fishery, is a move which is, if not explicitly political, 
ideologically motivated. It is at any rate hard to imagine a fisherman or a factory worker 
describe the landscape as Woolf does in the interlude. By not acknowledging this fact, Banfield 
fails to convince me that her analysis in fact engages the experience of Woolf’s fiction as an 
independent performance. Together with Bal I “cannot accept its implied elimination of 
responsibility.” (72) Banfield’s reading of the interlude, remains being a substantial but none 
the less superficial biographical reading of the way in which The Waves represents Russell’s 
philosophy. It results in failing to grasp the experience at stake in fiction and thereby also failing 
to grasp what is actually the particular epistemological nature of Woolf’s modernist fiction. 
Banfield’s interpretation of the form of The Waves seems to be dominated by allegory and 
representation and therefore not by the performance in itself.  
Understanding the interludes as Russell’s unperceived perspectives is detrimental for the 
moments when Banfield tries to think along with the experience of the novel. The reason is that 
when she in The Phantom Table does offer genuine creative thinking in relation to 
epistemology, as Banfield does in the chapters “Solus ipse, alone in the universe” and “The 
modern elegy”, these readings are affected by the framework through which she works. In other 
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words, Banfield’s performative and interesting “androgynous union of mysticism and logic” 
(386) remains uninteresting and sterile, without acknowledging another foundation for the 
thinking that is at stake in her book. The knowledge that Banfield does uncover and perform in 
her reading of Woolf’s modernist fiction, is so closely dependent on the possibility of objective 
representations and unperceived perspectives, that it is not possible to conceive this knowledge 
as independent from the representation of epistemology. That is the reason why I consider the 
representation of epistemology to be Banfield’s most interesting work in The Phantom Table, 
and ultimately why I see it as the most disappointing foundation for an exploration of the 
epistemology of Modernism.  
  
III – II The experience of fiction 
When I write that the experience of modernist fiction partakes in a creation of knowledge which 
can be categorised as epistemological, it is necessary to investigate and qualify this production 
further in order to develop it academically.  
The nature of the experience of fiction is, as Gourgouris points out, defined by Poiesis 
(11). Poiesis not only characterises the original event when the author actually, historically 
speaking, creates the work of art, but Poiesis also includes the singular performance of the 
artwork. In this sense, every new performance of fiction, is another creative process, Poiesis, 
taking place. This means that when dealing with the performance of fiction, the analytical object 
is the singular experience of the novel. For this reason, I will now turn my attention to three 
thinkers who all claim to turn their attention to the experience of the artwork, rather than the 
artwork itself. By doing so, it will become easier to understand how to make the experience of 
the artwork the centre of an analysis. And it will be possible to grasp the knowledge at stake in 
the experience of art better.  
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In the article “Recent Approaches to Aesthetic Experience” (2012)14 on the value and use 
of the experience of art, the American philosopher Noël Carroll proposes that the experience of 
art should predominantly be considered in relation to the content of the artwork. In order to 
establish why, he first uncovers a number of faulty approaches to the experience of artwork. 
Carroll warns about the dangers of the ‘valuing approach.’ He writes that “the valuing approach 
does not seem to have a way of rendering such experience intelligible.” (“Recent Approaches 
to Aesthetic Experience” 166) The ‘valuing approach’ is an approach which understands the 
singular process of ‘performing’ the artwork as an event that contains intrinsic cognitive value. 
Carroll writes that understanding the value of the aesthetic experience as an independent 
affective response to the artwork is, theoretically speaking, a dead end. It is uninformative, 
because as an affective reaction alone, Carroll believes, it is impossible to grasp the transition 
from affect to cognition, which is necessary in order to consider the experience of an artwork a 
process of cognition. The problem with affirming an intrinsic, cognitive, or affective, value in 
the aesthetic experience is thereby a problem of theory. Carroll is unable to accept the intrinsic 
value in the performance of artworks, as the beginning for theoretical consideration – in the 
sense of the word that it is methodologically reproducible and thereby academically relevant. 
Carroll writes that “if aesthetic experience is ultimately about valuing the ‘having’ of the 
experience for its own sake, then how would one tell someone else to go about doing that? … 
The formula is stunningly uninformative.” (“Recent Approaches to Aesthetic Experience” 168). 
What is important, however, is that Carroll does recognise that there is something at stake in 
the experience of a work of art in relation to knowledge, but he is wary with how to give this 
type of knowledge a theoretical value.  
What Carroll ultimately suggests, is to understand the aesthetic experience as an 
experience of credibility in relation to the artwork’s content. To Carroll, with the experience of 
                                                 
14 Carroll, Noël. “Recent Approaches to Aesthetic Experience.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
70.2 (2012): 165–77. Web.  
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the artwork, there follows one question of importance: Is the experience of the artwork credible 
and is this experience in line with the message of the content? In order to clarify his position, 
Carroll uses the example of a story about an infanticide. If the murderer in the story comes 
across reasonable and likeable, even though it was the artist’s intention to make a moral 
judgement against infanticide, then the artwork fails as an aesthetic object (Carroll, “Recent 
Approaches to Aesthetic Experience” 175). Failing as an aesthetic object means that the artist 
fails to create affect to support his artwork, the artwork fails in getting its message across 
successfully. He writes that “a work is formally or aesthetically defective if it attempts to 
embody or realize the point or purpose of a work in a way that is inappropriate or that impedes 
it.” (“Recent Approaches to Aesthetic Experience” 176 my emphasis) It is, in other words, the 
immediate emotional and affective response to the artwork that enables the use of the 
experience of the artwork in a scholarly discourse. This experience is only relevant in as far as 
it is able to help develop a deeper understanding of what the artist in general is trying to convey 
with the artwork. According to Carroll, the relevance of the artwork’s performance of 
knowledge in relation to scholarship, is a matter of affect, form, and most importantly whether 
or not these factors convey a sense of credibility. This results in the performance of knowledge 
being a matter of judging whether or not affect and form confirms the artwork’s overall 
argument (Carroll, “Recent Approaches to Aesthetic Experience” 176–7). Carroll understands 
the experience of the artwork to be relevant for thinking, only in so far as it is able to confirm 
the point or purpose of the artwork.  
It is theoretically speaking problematic to relate the “point or purpose of the work” 
(Carroll, “Recent Approaches to Aesthetic Experience” 173) back to the author’s intention. If 
the value of the experience of the artwork is only relevant in relation to the purpose of the work 
as the author perceived it in the moment of creation, then the experience is irrelevant to any 
theoretical work that goes beyond biographical considerations. Literary readings that depend 
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on the author’s intention is today, by and large, considered irrelevant in relation to a literary 
theory – mainly because of the difficulty of verifying the knowledge that one can get through 
the artist’s intention, but also because the artist’s intention is irrelevant in relation to what 
message the artwork actually conveys in its singular performance.15 There is, however, a 
different way of conceptualising the point or purpose of the artwork, namely as the point that 
the reader wishes to infer. In other words, the reader becomes the authority on what the point 
or purpose of the artwork is. The book Art in Mind (2005)16 by the Dutch literary scholar Ernst 
van Alphen, is an example of this approach. Investigating how Van Alphen relates the 
experience of the artwork to his own expectation to the point or purpose of the artwork, enables 
me to explore to which extent Carroll’s ‘content approach’ can actually be employed in the 
investigation of the experience of the work, without reverting to the author fallacy. 
In Art in Mind Van Alphen acknowledges the intrinsic value of the experience of the 
artwork in relation to abstract thinking. Without much of introduction, Van Alphen begins the 
first paragraph of the first chapter by investigating “Art as Thinking” (1). Van Alphen specifies 
that he, by following the theoretical framework of Hubert Damisch, understands art to partake 
in a broader production of knowledge, as the beholder “is invited to think ‘with’ the work of 
art, … to start a dialogue with it by articulating questions of a more general–for instance, 
philosophical, political, or social–nature.” (4) In this sense Van Alphen is in line with both 
Carroll and Gourgouris in considering the artwork to be a performance, which helps, he argues, 
with the construction of important questions. In Art in Mind Van Alphen uses works of art to 
investigate a plethora of important questions, such as the position of the women within modern 
culture (99-119), gender and sexuality (120-39) and the important question of how to remember 
the holocaust (180-203). Van Alphen writes, however, that this mode of thinking comes about 
                                                 
15 See Roland Barthes: “Death of the Author” (Barthes, Roland. “Death of the Author” The Norton 
Anthology of Theory and Criticism. Ed. Vincent B. Leitch et.  al. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001 
[2010]. 1322-26. Print.  
16 Van Alphen, Ernst. Art in Mind. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2005. Print. 
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in a juxtaposition to art history’s historification of art. Damisch “redefines the role of history in 
art history by showing again and again that only a theoretical perspective enables us to see 
works of art as a history of something.” (4)  Van Alphen is here effectively arguing that only 
by engaging the artwork in relation to an already established theoretical framework, –  as a 
history of ‘something’ – is it possible to approach the thinking at stake in the artwork within an 
academic discourse. He brackets the performance as well as the artwork’s content in order to 
use the experience of fiction as a way to visualise an argument. What is important for Van 
Alphen, is defined by the purpose of the theoretical discussion which the reader is engaged in. 
In this sense, the experience of the artwork fails to become a performance of the artwork in the 
sense that it is not performed and thinking is not at stake in the reading. Instead the artwork 
partakes in a mode of thinking which is already at stake in the beholder. In other words, 
according to Van Alphen, the thinking, in which the experience of art partakes, is a matter of 
the beholder’s predetermined theoretical framework. Understood like this, art again remains 
stuck at the level of representation. Art is then a philosophical discourse and the thinking at 
stake in art becomes a matter of intention. Not the intention of the author, but the intention of 
the beholder. The title of the first paragraph: ‘Art as thinking,’ confirms the intermediary 
character of art in Van Alphen’s conceptualisation. The main problem with Van Alphen’s use 
of the experience of artworks in Art in Mind, which echoes my problem with Carroll’s 
theoretical framework (and that of Banfield), is that he overrides the performance as an 
experience that is a singular event. The singularity is making the experience of the artwork 
intrinsically valuable. The experience of art is an anarchistic ‘possibility to think’ outside an 
already established discourse. The performance of the artwork opens a singular and independent 
field of interpretation, but both Carroll and Van Alphen are unwilling to grasp these fields of 
interpretation theoretically. To them the experience of the artwork always refers back to 
parameters that are outside the experience of the artwork itself. Theoretically speaking, Van 
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Alphen is unable to point to any reason intrinsic to the artwork, that justifies why art should be 
perceived as thinking. “Art as thinking” seems to stipulate that it could just as well be other 
things. “[T]his ‘visual thought’” Van Alphen writes about a portrait by Rineke Dijkstra “is … 
undeniably a demonstration of thinking and, specifically, of thinking history.” (47) I agree with 
Van Alphen that art is an alternative modus of thinking – in the sense that thinking is taking 
place – but without a development of an independent theoretical framework for art’s thinking, 
it will remain impossible not to get stuck in the subject’s discovery of an object. An 
understanding of knowledge at stake in art that, like Banfield’s- and Carroll’s reading, is unable 
to transgress the dominance of the subject’s ‘I.’ Van Alphen’s interpretations are personal 
readings that are violently forcing a context through which the artworks are to be understood. 
In order to understand how art is thinking, instead of understanding art as thinking, I turn to the 
intrinsic value in the aesthetic experience as the Danish philosopher Dorthe Jørgensen 
conceptualises it. I will demonstrate how Jørgensen conceptualises the experience of art, as free 
and creative cognition, which relates the world around us as knowledge.  
Similar to the two previous thinkers, Jørgensen investigates the special character of 
knowledge at stake in the experience of art. Her point of departure is that the experience of art 
takes part in an alternative, or expanded, mode of thinking (“Sensoriness and Transcendence” 
68)17. The main difference between her approach to the experience of art and that of Van Alphen 
and Carroll, is that Jørgensen explicitly tries develop a theoretical framework for understanding 
the thinking which is at stake in the experience of art as a singular and independent event. To 
Jørgensen, thinking (and cognition) is not “an act, but an event” (“Sensoriness and 
Transcendence” 67). The knowledge at stake in the experience of art, can not be knowledge 
which is defined by a subject investigating an object. The result of this is that knowledge can 
neither be understood as intended by the author nor by the reader. There is a form of creation 
                                                 
17 Jørgensen, Dorthe. “Sensoriness and Transcendence.” Transcendence and Sensoriness: Perceptions, 
Revelation, and the Arts. Ed. Geir Tryggve Hellemo et al. Leiden: Brill, 2015. 267–268. Web. 
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of knowledge in itself at stake in the experience itself and the experience is therefore absolutely 
crucial. In this way, Jørgensen also answers Carroll’s critique of understanding the experience 
of the artwork as an experience of intrinsic value. This means that the experience of art is 
valuable even though it is not reproducible. Jørgensen argues that the knowledge at stake in art 
is always singular, which also makes the knowledge at stake in art new in the broader sense 
word. To Jørgensen, the artwork accommodates an alternative mode of thinking that is per 
definition always new, and therefore more difficult to grasp in language, but none the less more 
giving in praxis.  
In order to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the relation between art 
and thinking, Jørgensen argues that “as human beings, we have aesthetic experiences, and these 
experiences call for interpretation” (“Why do We Need Philosophical Aesthetics” 31)18. 
Jørgensen conceptualises ‘experience’ differently than for example Carroll. To Jørgensen any 
experience, is only considered to be a proper experience when the experience gives rise to 
cognitive value (“The Experience of Immanent Transcendence” 35)19. Experience proper 
separates itself from mere impression by kindling cognition as well as the senses. Jørgensen 
writes that “an impression doesn’t leave any lasting trace in the person who has it, apart from 
the recollection of the mental ‘dent’ it may have left behind. … [E]xperiences bring about 
changes, and consequently occasion wondering and also reflection, although the individual may 
not be conscious of ‘thinking’.” (“The Experience of Immanent Transcendence” 37) The 
knowledge at stake in mere impression, is a knowledge that becomes a question of a form of 
correspondence between the subject’s mental image and an actual object in external world. 
“Cognition is thus regarded as a mental act, performed by a mind that in order to execute its act 
of cognition consciously reaches out for something other” (Jørgensen, “Sensoriness and 
                                                 
18 Jørgensen, Dorthe. “Why Do We Need Philosophical Aesthetics.” Transfiguration: Nordic Journal of 
Religion and the Arts 3.1 (2010): 17–34. Web. 
19 Jørgensen, Dorthe. “The Experience of Immanent Transcendence.” Transfiguration: Nordic Journal of 
Religion and the Arts 5.1 (2011): 35–52. Web. 
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Transcendence” 67). The cognition at stake in the ‘proper’ experience of the artwork, however, 
is of a different nature. In the experience of the artwork cognition takes form as an event that 
happens to the subject. “[C]ognizing is something that happens to the subject” as an experience 
proper, “instead of being something that it is in charge of.” … “The event that this comes to be 
is both the cognition, and the truth about what shows itself” (Jørgensen, “Sensoriness and 
Transcendence” 67). This is the reason, according to Jørgensen, for it being detrimental for the 
act of thinking to grasp the performance of knowledge in the artwork as either corresponding 
to the author’s intention or an already established theoretical discourse. The knowledge at stake 
in fiction is according to Jørgensen an event that can only happen to the subject, given that the 
subject awards attention to the event. She does not hesitate to define this more open and erratic 
form of knowledge as actual “true knowledge” (“Sensoriness and Transcendence” 67) in a more 
traditional and philosophical sense, because it is a form of knowledge that creates something 
new.  
This understanding of the aesthetic experience is different than the most common 
conceptualisations today. In Carroll’s article, the specifically aesthetic part of an experience is 
merely that the experience has been raised by an aesthetic object – meaning an object that is 
considered to be an artistic object. Jørgensen writes, however, that the term ‘Aesthetica’ was 
by H. G. Baumgarten coined as a term relating to the Greek aisthanomai, designating the 
possibility of obtaining knowledge through experience. Drawing on Baumgarten’s definition 
Jørgensen labels the alternative process of thinking for ‘beautiful,’ because the processes of 
thinking begin in relation to the concept of beauty. “[B]eautiful [is] everything that has a value 
in itself, and which thus differs from the useful by having its purpose in itself” (Jørgensen, 
“Sensoriness and Transcendence” 66). Consequently, one is thinking beautifully, when the 
process does not have a goal outside itself (Jørgensen, Den Skønne Tænkning 45)20. The product 
                                                 
20 Jørgensen, Dorthe. Den Skønne Tænkning. Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2014. Print. 
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of beautiful thinking is an independent form of reflection, which takes its point of departure in 
the experience of the artwork, without letting either representation or performance dominate. 
Beautiful thinking is characterized by receiving meaning and cohesion in the reflective process 
the performance of the artwork instigates. But because the experience in itself does not offer 
knowledge as a finalised body of thought, the experiences of cohesion and meaningfulness 
require interpretation. In a sense, interpretation is precisely what already differentiates 
experience proper from mere impression – experience proper is a reflexive, transgressive, 
openness, as opposed to the objective character of the ‘dent’ of impression. The cohesion and 
meaningfulness being experienced are symbolic, which demands a conscious reflexive 
interpretation on the part of the individual having the experience. Experience proper relates to 
a reality which is not immediately accessible, in the sense that it is not “a fact in the empirical 
sense, instead it is a hypothetical interpretation of what is” … “Or, more precisely ... [we] have 
the very experience in common that a feeling of cohesion and meaningfulness is possible, 
however different the individual manifestation of the feeling [we] remember may be.” 
(Jørgensen, “The Experience of Immanent Transcendence” 37–8) The reader has to be open to 
the symbolic character of the artwork. Not understood as a transcendental symbol that 
transgresses the artwork, but rather as something which is always immanently available in the 
experience of the artwork. The difference between the interpretative move, which is suggested 
by Jørgensen, and that which I have been criticising earlier in Banfield’s and Van Alphen’s 
work, is that Jørgensen requires that the investigation in the experience of the artwork. 
Jørgensen suggests a hermeneutic approach, which takes the experience serious as that which 
is valuable in itself. In this sense the experience should be understood as an event, which with 
an openness toward new knowledge, dissolves the schism between the interrogating subject and 
the interrogated object (Jørgensen, “Sensoriness and Transcendence” 74). In this sense, the 
experience dissolves knowledge, which is understood as that of an enlightened subject instead, 
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and this is where Jørgenen’s approach is dovetailing nicely with Modernism’s simultaneous use 
of both representation and performance to start reflection.  
  
III – III Time is changing  
In the above chapter, I laid out how modernist fiction should be understood as being both a 
performance of thinking as well as a representation of thinking. I have tried to follow this train 
of thought in order to be able to investigate the relation between The Waves and epistemology. 
Jørgensen, Van Alphen and Carroll, all understand art, and the experience of the artwork, as an 
important factor in the process of thinking. For Carroll and Van Alphen, however, the 
experience of the artwork remains external to the process of thinking at stake in fiction. To them 
the experience is more a support rather than an act of thinking in itself. Carroll channels his 
interest toward the content of the artwork (“Defending the Content Approach to Aesthetic 
Experience” 172)21 and Van Alphen claims that art thinks, while all the thinking seems to take 
place everywhere but in the experience of the artwork. Van Alphen expects thinking in art, 
without developing a framework for how art thinks. He employs the thinking which is going on 
‘in’ art, in order to expand on an already established theoretical framework. Jørgensen argues 
that the reader has to be open for the thinking that is at stake in the performance of fiction. The 
reader has to interpret the symbolic nature of the experience as that which ‘shows itself, as itself 
in itself’. To my estimation, both Carroll and Van Alphen fall short of entering into a genuine 
relation with the knowledge producing experience of the artwork, because they try to employ 
the experience of the artwork, without letting the experience be the point of departure in their 
work. As a result, they focus excessively on the theory that they are developing, rather than the 
content of their experience. In other words, the performance of fiction, a part of the actual 
                                                 
21 Carroll, Noël. “Defending the Content Approach to Aesthetic Experience.” Metaphilosophy 46.2 (2015): 
171–188. Web. 
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experience of the artwork, becomes a by-product of the theoretical framework they employ – 
in this way the experience itself is bracketed by the experience’s relationship to theory.  
Carroll calls his approach to the experience of art a ‘content’ approach (“Defending the 
Content Approach to Aesthetic Experience” 172). He writes that insofar an “aesthetic 
experience is an experience, it has content. One straightforward way of attempting to get at the 
nature of aesthetic experience is to attempt to circumscribe that content.” (“Recent Approaches 
to Aesthetic Experience” 173) The circumscription of the experience is of critical importance 
and Carroll points toward art’s ‘qualitative dimension’ as the main parameter for aesthetic 
experience. Under art’s qualitative dimension, Carroll considers the ‘anthropomorphic’- or 
affective properties to be the most relevant, e.g.: “the joy in the orchestral music” (“Recent 
Approaches to Aesthetic Experience” 173). According to Carroll there are two ways of dealing 
with these ‘expressive properties’ or ‘properties of intensity’: “either [we] attend to the sadness 
in the dance or we may attend, at one remove, to the way in which the organization of the 
elements of the choreography elicits the impression of sadness from us.” (“Recent Approaches 
to Aesthetic Experience” 173) Attending to the aesthetic experience, is, in other words, a matter 
of both attending to the affect that the artwork transfers and to the way in which this affect, 
formally speaking, comes about. This creates two issues that a Carrollian analysis has to make 
clear. First, what are the text’s expressive properties? – Meaning, which elements in the text 
invoke affect (Carroll, “Defending the Content Approach to Aesthetic Experience” 174). 
Second, how are these properties coming into being? These two questions then have to be 
related to the artwork’s point or purpose, because only then is it, according to Carroll, possible 
to argue that the aesthetic experience has a place within scholarly discourse. I will now attempt 
to explore the practical difference between Carroll and Van Alphen’s approach and Jørgensen’s 
attention to the experience itself. I will be testing the two modes of reading with a short passage 
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from The Waves. Let me start by elucidating the first parameter in relation to the text, by 
investigating my own experience of sadness and melancholy in the following passage:  
‘And Time,’ said Bernard, ‘lets fall its drop. The drop that has formed on the roof of the 
soul falls. On the roof of my mind time, forming, lets fall its drop. Last week as I stood 
shaving, the drop fell. I, standing with my razor in my hand, became suddenly aware of 
the merely habitual nature of my action (this is the drop forming) and congratulated my 
hands, ironically, for keeping at it. Shave, shave, shave, I said. Go on shaving. The drop 
fell. All through the day’s work, at intervals, my mind went to an empty place, saying, 
“What is lost? What is over?” And “Over and done with,” I muttered, “over and done 
with”, solacing myself with words. People noticed the vacuity of my face and the 
aimlessness of my conversation. The last words of my sentence tailed away. And as I 
buttoned on my coat to go home I said more dramatically “I have lost my youth”. (Woolf, 
The Waves 153) 
Bernard is here confronted with a new experience of time. Not because time itself changes, but 
Bernard’s perception of time changes – time becomes a finite entity that slowly sieves away, 
drop for drop. At the moment Bernard realises how time shifts toward irretrievability, “the 
merely habitual nature of … [his] action[s]” (Woolf, The Waves 153) exposes the present as a 
composition of past and future. Bernard is lamenting the loss of youth and the radical possibility 
youth contains. Throughout The Waves, Bernard dreams of becoming a poet. In his youth 
Bernard is not shy to pre-emptively quote his own future biographer or of comparing himself 
to Byron (Woolf, The Waves 61-3). But while shaving Bernard loses his until then natural 
relation to the world, because his urge to represent changes as he experiences time bifurcate. 
Bernard no longer experiences the same necessity to represent the world. His once ‘beautiful 
speech’ has left him and he starts questioning the nature of language and even the relevance of 
description. Bernard asks: “[W]hy describe a man in trouble with his mule?” only to 
immediately retort that: “It is over” (Woolf, The Waves 156). It is as if the altered relationship 
with the present makes description wholly irrelevant. Bernard’s youthful hubris defines the 
sadness of the passage. The dreams of a young man invoke a sense of possibility, but in 
combination with the same man’s desperation at not fulfilling his potential, they invoke a sense 
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of sadness and melancholy. Let me now try to move beyond my immediate response to the 
passage, in order to get a better understanding of the experience.   
At the moment we encounter Bernard in the passage above, the passing of time is 
increasingly becoming a more central part of the story. The importance of time surges after two 
important events take place – the sun reaching its zenith in the fifth interlude and the death of 
Percival (Woolf, The Waves 121-4). The sun reaching its zenith can be read allegorically as if 
the life of the six has peaked. This occurrence, in combination with the death of their dear friend 
Percival, forces the characters, not only to contemplate death, but also their own extended 
process of dying. This extended process of dying is accentuated by the repetitive nature of 
everyday life – “Shave, shave, shave, I said. Go on shaving. The drop fell.” (Woolf, The Waves 
153) The unrestricted present is inherent and the possibilities of time in youth have bifurcated 
toward a restricted and finite future, defined the inability to living up to the dreams of the youth. 
The main shift in the passage is a shift in Bernard’s relationship with time. Before Bernard’s 
new relationship with time he still has ideas and dreams of a future. But these ideas or dreams 
are of a kind that relate to the present. For example, just after starting at college Bernard dreams 
of his own future: “Let me suppose that I am asked to stay at Restover, King’s Laughton” 
(Woolf, The Waves 64). In youth Bernard dreams, not of a future, but rather of a present. The 
‘future’ is not a relation to a possible future reality, but rather a wish for a different present. The 
same with the past, it is not a relation to something that has passed, but rather a hope to relive 
experiences.  
Before Bernard’s experience of the bifurcation of time in the passage quoted above, the 
future and the past are a sort of implicit, not-yet-realised or already-realised, present. At the 
moment we meet the middle-aged Bernard, however, we encounter him in the process of 
discovering a new relationship with- and perception of time. The future and the past are no 
longer conditions of the present. The initial shock pertaining to the new form of time is 
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disregarded with an ironic gesture, as Bernard is congratulating his hands for “keeping at it” 
(Woolf, The Waves 153) in the face of his discovery. Irony, however, is unable to hold back a 
new reality and a new experience of time. Bernard conceptualises the experience as a drop 
hanging from the “roof of the soul.” The singular and repetitive way in which water drops, is 
being used as a metaphor for how the passing of time manifests itself to Bernard. By using the 
drop as a metaphor, time develops from being a series of singular presents to bifurcate into a 
past and a future. To Bernard time is now irreversibly conditioned by the past and the future. 
The past designates the missed opportunities of youth and the future conversely highlights the 
demise of the present. When time is characterised by a future-past dichotomy the creative 
process also seizes to hold power. Bernard’s literary masterpiece has not yet materialised and 
with the development of a time that is an indication of past-future, Bernard also loses the 
opportunity to let it materialise in the future. The new perception of time strips him of his 
identity as a writer – this loss must be the instigator of my sense of sadness and melancholy.  
I have tried to focus the short analysis on the specific theme in the passage quoted above. 
I hope to have revealed how the changing experience of time results in Bernard losing his 
identity as a writer and poet, which in turn instigates sadness and melancholy. It is an attempt 
at an analysis, which conforms to Carroll’s expectation of the aesthetic experience. What 
Carroll then proposes the scholar working with aesthetic experience to do, is to focus on the 
affect that the experience produces and its formal condition – the feeling of melancholy 
produced by time and the formally speaking different role of time – and relate them to the point 
or the purpose of the text. It is, however, in relation to the purpose of the text that Carroll’s use 
of the aesthetic experience becomes problematic, because if the text’s purpose is defined from 
the perspective of the writer’s intention, which Carroll suggests, it is not possible to use the 
aesthetic experience in any other circumstance than in biographical readings. As mentioned 
above, the authors intention is today, by and large, considered irrelevant in relation to a literary 
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theory – mainly because there is no way of confirming knowledge, scholarly speaking, that has 
to invoke author intention. I will in the following, similar to what Van Alphen does in Art in 
Mind, try to adapt my reading of the text to a point or purpose which relates to already 
established theory.  
As explained earlier, Banfield proposes that Woolf’s fiction is a representation of a 
Russellian epistemology. If the aesthetic experience, an experience of melancholy and sadness 
– an experience formally speaking conditioned by a shift in the representation of time and a 
dissolving identity – is of relevance in Banfield’s analysis, it can only be in relation to whether 
or not the aesthetic experience authorises the moments in her analysis where melancholy and 
sadness take part. In other words, it is necessary to find the place in the theoretical framework 
where the specific aesthetic experience is relevant. The aesthetic experience can then affirm the 
reliability of her analysis. Banfield’s theoretical framework on Woolf’s fiction, however, does 
not include feelings of melancholy or sadness. But Banfield does argue that Woolf’s fiction is 
to be read as a modern elegy, an elegy to the lost members of her family and the loss of 
innocence in modernity (The Phantom Table 236).  
Woolf’s elegiac form is … prose fiction she qualifies as “modern.” Its modernity partly 
lies in its not flinching before the reality of death in all its starkness[.] … It does not 
suffice for the modern elegy to set down the brutal reality, it must also end mourning. The 
call to weep must become that to “weep no more.” (Banfield, The Phantom Table 236-7, 
my emphasis) 
According to Banfield, Woolf’s fiction disavows sadness and melancholy. But if we are to take 
my experience serious, then it goes against Banfield’s reading of Woolf’s modern elegy, 
because the modern elegy is a departure from melancholic preoccupation with that which has 
been lost. Banfield finds that Woolf’s Modernism is a “work of mourning” which enables the 
reader to move beyond the egotistical preoccupation (The Phantom Table 237). In this sense, 
there seems to be little or no consistency between Banfield’s analysis and my aesthetic 
experience, as I have laid it out above. There is, to use Carroll’s words: “a gap between what 
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the work mandates and what it makes affectively available.” (“Recent Approaches to Aesthetic 
Experience” 176) And though Carroll here relates to the gap between the intention of the author 
and what the author puts forward in the text, the same applies for Van Alphen’s imposition of 
theory over the text.  
What I hope to have made clear in the previous, is that the way in which Carroll and Van 
Alphen try to use the aesthetic experience within academic writing, always reduces the 
experience of the artwork to being an auxiliary argument. The experience can either confirm or 
disprove relations, but it is not valued as an alternative process of knowledge in itself. Using 
the experience of the artwork as a supporting argument, is a detrimental reduction considering 
the cognitive potential Jørgensen proposes the experience to contain. To Van Alphen and 
Carroll, the aesthetic experience is merely useful, but as an experience of value – as an intricate 
moment of creative thinking in itself – both Carroll’s- and Van Alphen’s aesthetic experience 
fail to add anything original.  
I will later return to the critical nature of the reduction of the aesthetic experience, but 
first I will offer a reading of the passage above by trying to approach the aesthetic experience 
as an experience in itself valuable. I will let the experience conduct the development of the 
argument as a mode of thinking in its own right. In the passage Bernard’s perception of time 
develops in crucial manner. The experience is not one that points toward something of material 
nature, but it is rather an experience that relates to his sense of his place in the world (in this 
sense, the passage above is in fact a representation of Bernard having an aesthetic experience). 
The experience renders him momentarily incapable of relating to his own body as a part of 
himself – together with his identity he loses his subjectivity. He is distanced from himself in 
the sense that his natural relation to the world, becomes a relationship of misfiring intention – 
“People noticed my vacuity of my face and the aimlessness of my conversation.” (Woolf, The 
Waves 153) It is hard for Bernard to pin-point the specific nature of his new relationship with 
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time. What he is able to establish, however, is that the experience is of a nature that irretrievably 
changes his relation to the world – “I have lost my youth” (Woolf, The Waves 153).  
What Bernard experiences as a loss of youth, is in fact a loss of a natural relationship 
between language (description) and reality. Throughout The Waves Bernard lives through 
descriptions of the external world – he states that he “only comes into existence when the 
plumber, or the horse-dealer, or whoever it may be, says something which sets me alight.” 
(Woolf, The Waves 109) Bernard’s natural impulse is to interpret reality through words. The 
fact that life, to Bernard, consists of a natural urge to interpret reality through description, offers 
an interesting emphasis on the relationship between representation and performance. Before 
being confronted with the influence of time, Bernard’s literary descriptions consist of creative 
representations. When arriving in London by train, Bernard describes the city as following: 
“‘How fair, how strange,’ … ‘glittering, many-pointed and many-domed London lies before 
me under mist. Guarded by gasometers, by factory chimneys, she lies sleeping as we approach.” 
(Woolf, The Waves 91) His description of London includes creative additions as well as general 
anthropomorphisation, but most importantly Bernard is unable not to mix representation and 
imagination.  
When he is confronted with the bifurcation of time, we learn that the natural equilibrium 
between representation and language (form) is disturbed. Bernard discovers his own mortality 
and he loses his immediate descriptive relation to reality. Creative representation no longer 
offers Bernard a trustworthy vent of his interpretative urge, and his descriptions become pure 
representation that are essentially empty of a true creative impulse. Language has become fake 
and it is exposed in its impotence when he attempts to increase the theatricality: “And as I 
buttoned up my shirt coat to go home I said more dramatically, “I have lost my youth”.” (Woolf, 
The Waves 153). Before the bifurcation of time, the descriptive interpretation of reality was 
characterised by an equilibrium between representation and pure creation. But as Bernard 
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discovers that his perception of time has changed, the equilibrium is eschewed. Description 
becomes pure representation, which he over-dramatizes in an attempt to regain the force which 
his descriptions had earlier. Description and representation are exposed in their emptiness. In 
this sense, by experiencing the bifurcation of time, Bernard’s urge to describe is exposed as a 
lost struggle between reality and representation, a struggle that he discovers reality to have lost 
long ago.  
Bernard’s relation to time is absolutely crucial for his being in the world. It changes his 
ability to interpret and create a reality around him and it forces him to revaluate his own position 
as a subject in relation to the external world. The change that Bernard experiences, beautifully 
exposes the importance for reflecting on the role of time in life. Is time a matter of past/future 
or an unconditional present? It is at any instance important to reflect on this essential matter in 
life, in order not to be swept off your feet by a tidal wave of change. Such reflections are difficult 
to begin with and they are not made easier by trying to relate to time through its scientific 
conceptualisations. In physics, time is relevant to your position in a gravitational field. Earth’s 
gravitational field offers a time we have defined by the 24 hours it takes the earth to spin around 
its own axis in relation to the sun. The consequences of the time that physics confronts us with 
is endlessly difficult to think through, it is therefore necessary to conceptualise it differently. 
Bernard’s discovery of his own relation to time in The Waves, is one such attempt to think it 
through differently. An attempt which forces the reader to reflect on the very abstract manner 
through which we experience time. 
In the previous I attempted to let my analysis be guided by my own experience of the text. 
In order to let the analysis, remain free I have only sporadically connected it to the ongoing 
discussions of this thesis. I have, however, attempted to stay focused on the fact that fiction 
contains two parallel series that both have to be included, because it is when these series 
intersect that knowledge occurs. In this sense, I have tried to accommodate the thinking at stake 
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in modernist fiction by attempting to keep the series of representation out from the series of 
performance. These two series both form the experience of the artwork, but at the same time 
they are still independent from each other. I will in the following and last chapter elaborate 
further on using the experience in the reading of a text, as well as I will discuss the relationship 
between representation and performance further. 
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IV – Waves and series – Knowledge at stake in The Waves  
In the previous chapter, I investigated Carroll’s, Van Alphen’s, and Jørgensen’s approach to 
the experience of art, in order to establish a way to approach the knowledge at stake in the 
experience. I found that the three thinkers all agree that the experience of art brings about 
something more, something that within a naturalistic epistemology can be defined as 
knowledge. There are, however, big discrepancies between the way the three thinkers relate to 
the knowledge at stake in the experience of art. I argued that Van Alphen fails to engage the 
knowledge at stake in the experience of the artwork itself, because he uses art as a means to 
visualise and justify various theoretical positions and different theoretical developments in 
thinking. Carroll and Jørgensen, on the other hand, try to engage and develop the knowledge at 
stake in the experience of art within an academic discourse. But the two thinkers approach this 
knowledge in very different manners. Carroll proposes that the reader is to approach the formal 
characteristics of the text and put them in relation to the point or purpose of the text. By doing 
so, Carroll is not able to substantiate what the point of an artwork is, and the method seems to 
impose external considerations on both the representational level as well as the performative. 
Jørgensen on the other hand, proposes that art demands a free and imaginative – hermeneutic – 
approach, in order to facilitate the thinking inherently at stake in the experience of art. Free in 
the sense that if art’s cognitive potential is taken seriously, it must not be reduced to proving a 
point in another argument, because then the knowledge fails at being truly new. Imaginative in 
the sense that it is only by approaching the artwork with an open imagination that there will be 
a possibility for knowledge to develop and establish itself in the meeting between the object 
and the subject. Taking Jørgensen’s framework as something to be developed further, I attempt 
to uncover how knowledge is experienced in and through The Waves.  
If Modernism is more intimately related to epistemology than other artistic movements, 
this is a consequence of, as I have argued above, the way in which the modernist fiction makes 
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representation and performance interact, more than it is a product of either one, or the other 
aspect of fiction. The performance of the artwork is irreducible, it is always becoming and never 
a representation of exclusively external factors. With this framework in mind, I will approach 
the epistemology of Modernism anew. The two factors I will pay close attention to in the 
reading of Woolf’s text, are how the series of representation and of performance interact to 
create a singular experience of fiction. In The Waves the two series are closely related to each 
other. On the level of representation, Bernard is deeply invested in an exploration of the 
possibilities (and debilities) of language. Bernard’s struggle with language is theoretically 
interesting, because his struggle, as it is represented by Woolf, is mirroring the reader’s struggle 
in the experience of modernist fiction. In effect I will follow the connections and questions that 
arise in reading the text, in order to attempt to interpret these experiences in relation to the 
possibility of grasping the knowledge at stake in the The Waves. This approach is clearly 
hermeneutic, but instead of basing itself on an investigation of a transcendent truth or meaning 
inherent in the artwork, the truth which is at stake in this form of reading is the experience itself 
(“Sensoriness and Transcendence” 69). In this sense the approach broadens from being a narrow 
close reading, to become an investigation of the way in which knowledge comes to be in the 
experience. I will attempt to continually return to the representation of Bernard’s struggle with 
the role of language in life, as well as my personal struggle with language in the experience of 
the text.  
This approach will enable me to respond to the questions that have been posed in this 
thesis. Namely, to which extent knowledge is transferred in The Waves and how. The approach 
will help me explore how Modernism foregrounds questions – not only as representations of 
questions, but rather as a compound of performance and representation of questions. I do not 
expect that this approach will harness the knowledge at stake in fiction and thereby propose one 
single unified argument. Instead I expect that the production of knowledge at stake in the 
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experience of fiction to be erratic, multifaceted, and diverse, which makes it my work as a 
literary scholar to grasp and accentuate the experiences that can become one argument.  
 
IV – I Rhythmic fiction – modernist fiction? 
As explained in the above chapters, in The Waves Woolf writes about the lives of the six friends 
through an external narrator’s short declaratory interjections. The reader experiences the story 
through the private perspectives of internal monologues. These character-bound internal 
monologues are framed by the interludes that are set in free indirect discourse. As a reader, I 
gain access to a world, which is seemingly fragmented and filled with the idiosyncrasies of each 
speaker, but at the same time there is an external, objective, world outside each speakers’ private 
perspective. In the introduction to the Oxford University Press edition of the novel, Gillian Beer 
writes about the alternative setup of the novel that: “Woolf … make[s] it clear that this [The 
Waves] was to be experimental work, work that would fundamentally challenge the bounds of 
fiction.” (xv) Beer tries to make the reader appreciate that The Waves is not a traditional work 
of fiction, in the sense that it does not follow established or traditional narrative patterns. 
Instead, The Waves follows individual perceptions, scattered events that form several 
interjecting and intersecting series. Beer states that this mode of storytelling is modernist, 
because its experimental mode of narration tries to grasp what is left out by traditional 
storytelling. She qualifies this by arguing that The Waves “would test the established 
demarcations between individual and communal experience. It would extend the reach of 
language and suffer its debilities. It would follow a rhythm, not a plot.” (Beer xv, my emphasis) 
The rhythm that Beer discovers in The Waves, is Woolf’s contribution to modernist fiction. It 
is an alternative mode of storytelling. As a rhythmic novel, The Waves develops less toward 
one final and unified story and more toward a general development of singular parts that 
accompany each other to form a pattern. Percival’s death is a good example of this alternative 
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mode of rhythmic storytelling: Percival dies suddenly, not within the story, but rather in the six 
speakers’ experience of his death. Whereas Neville is devastated with grief, he recognises his 
death immediately: “’He is dead’ said Neville. ‘He fell. His horse tripped.” (Woolf, The Waves 
124) Rhoda approaches Percival’s death in a more indirect manner: “‘Now the shadow has 
fallen and the purple light slants downwards.” (Woolf, The Waves 130) To Louis, Percival’s 
death is recalled somewhat parenthetically and only in relation to his own comparable position 
in society: “‘Percival has died … Susan has children; Neville mounts rapidly to the conspicuous 
heights. Life passes.” (Woolf, The Waves 140) The death of Percival is more a distinct event in 
the ongoing rhythm, than it is a development of the plot. The event deeply influences every 
speaker, without any of them witnessing the physical occurrence. The event gains immense 
importance as the characters continuously revisit his death through their meeting with the world. 
Percival’s death is, instead of a development of the plot and a distinct element of closure, or an 
element that is opening the story further, a phantom which rhythmically returns throughout the 
novel. In this sense, each character represents a unique rhythm and each of these rhythms 
intersect and interact with the other at several instances. Every rhythm is made up by singular 
events and sometimes the same event partakes in all rhythms, such as Percival’s death. 
Understood as a rhythm, Woolf’s experimental fiction can be read as an attempt to 
accommodate the, in Deleuzian terms, serial nature of the experience of the real world. 
A novel that follows a rhythm rather than a plot, is a challenge directed against the 
traditional nature of prose – as Beer writes: The Waves “would bring into question what gets 
left out when life is described.” (xv) Modernist prose must have, as Beer quotes Woolf for 
writing in “The Narrow Bridge of Art” “‘something of the exaltation of poetry, but much of the 
ordinariness of prose. It will be dramatic, and yet not a play. It will be read, not acted.’” (xxi) 
Woolf’s experimental fiction is an attempt to transgress the status of language as a mean of 
representation. Language is to Woolf a problematic barrier between the external world of the 
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reader and the fictional world of the text. Following a rhythm rather than a plot is an attempt at 
diminishing the difference between the reader’s experience of the external world and his or her 
experience of the fictional world. In this sense, Woolf’s rhythmic fiction is not at first something 
which foregrounds questions of an epistemological nature, but rather an attempt to make the 
experience of fiction more in tune with the experience of objective reality – an attempt at 
disrupting the barrier between the subject and the text. The rhythmic nature of The Waves forces 
the reader to perform the novel on a different level than a plot-based novel. It is as a different 
type of performance that The Waves becomes epistemologically relevant, it is as a rhythm that 
Woolf’s modernist fiction is closer related to the experience of the real world.  
Jørgensen explains that Western culture is dominated by an ocularcentric paradigm, 
which effectively makes it impossible to disregard the subject of the reader (“Sensoriness and 
Transcendence” 71). Ocularcentricism is, like logocentrism, a negative aspect of the Western 
Enlightenment ideals that Modernism is trying to depart from. Jørgensen suggests that the 
multisensory peripheral vision and a more tactile being-in-the-world, should be emphasised as 
an analytical tool. The rhythm at stake in The Waves is, opposed to representation, a 
multisensory experience that accommodates the nature of peripheral being-part-of. As a 
rhythm, Woolf represents the story in The Waves as something different from the logocentric, 
one-dimensional, plot-based representation. By employing rhythm Woolf relates neither to the 
mind nor the body, the rhythm creates a being-part-of. The rhythm makes the performance of 
modernist fiction dovetail with that which is being represented. This collaboration accentuates 
the fact that The Waves perform an anti-logocentric epistemology.  
By emphasising the rhythmic nature of The Waves, I have returned to the question of how 
epistemology is at stake in Modernism. The fact that Modernism is better understood as a 
performance of knowledge rather than a form of fiction that represents epistemology, opens up 
for a discussion regarding how The Waves relates the knowledge at stake in the experience of 
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it. I have just argued that the knowledge at stake in The Waves depends more on the experience 
of a rhythm rather than a plot. The rhythmic nature of the novel implies that it is important to 
investigate the specific way in which rhythm is present in our experience of reality and 
production of knowledge. In other words, by employing rhythm as a way to tell a story, The 
Waves is maybe closer related to the way in which we obtain knowledge from the external 
world than other novels. 
 
IV – II Language, sense and rhythm 
In order to do so I turn to The Logic of Sense (1969)22 by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, 
in which he investigates the relationship between sense and knowledge. Deleuze explains that 
“[s]ense is never only one of the two terms of the duality which contrasts things and 
propositions, substantives and verbs, denotations and expressions” instead sense is always an 
“articulation of the difference between the two terms, since it has at its disposal an 
impenetrability which is its own and within which it is reflected.” (35) Sense, Deleuze explains, 
is always “at the frontier, at the cutting edge” – it is the event of the coming together of the 
aforementioned dualities. Sense is, however, not something which necessarily has to be thought 
hard and long about, because “one is established … within sense.” (Deleuze 35) This means 
that sense is not a question of the subject’s intentional ‘sensing’ of the world, rather “[s]ense is 
like the sphere in which I am already established in order to enact possible denotations, and 
even to think their conditions” (35). What makes Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the production 
of knowledge in sense relevant for this thesis, is that according to him the moment of sense is 
an event, and the event is a part of a series. As events within series, sense necessarily always 
already makes sense (35). The sensual impression of the external world is simultaneous with 
                                                 
22 Deleuze, Gilles. The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. 2004. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014. Print. 
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the experience’s making-sense of the external world. Sense and making sense are series that 
run parallel to each other, but at the same time they interact, interrelate and intersect to such an 
extent that the two series are, analytically speaking, not interesting if untangled (38). This 
means that the experience of the external world, such as the young Bernard’s urge to describe 
the world in his meeting with it, is impossible to conceptualise and imagine as nonsense. At the 
same time his urge to describe is also an abstraction from a world that necessarily already makes 
sense on in itself.  
In order to elucidate in which way I believe Deleuze’s conceptualisation of sense is 
relevant for The Waves I will delve further into Bernard’s life and his relation to description. 
Bernard has intense difficulties with his experience of reality and the way in which reality is 
represented in language. As mentioned above, Bernard has, from an early age already a 
relationship with representation, which is different from the other speakers in The Waves. 
Already in their childhood Susan becomes aware of this character trait and she says: “Now you 
trail away … making phrases” (Woolf, The Waves 12) in an attempt to stop Bernard from 
entering a world of fiction. She stops him, because while ‘making phrases’ Bernard loses an 
immediate relationship with the external world, a relationship that already makes sense without 
being represented. Bernard’s relationship with the external world is conditioned not only by his 
ability to describe it through language, but also by his need to describe it. In this sense, to 
Bernard reality is an abstract assemblage of representation and presentation, in which 
representation seems to play a larger role than for the other five speakers. It is necessary for 
Bernard to filter his experiences through language, in order for him to be in the external world.  
This relationship sometimes comes off as problematic, because Bernard again and again 
gets sidetracked in his descriptions. In the following, Bernard and Jinny are escaping the others, 
but his urge to represent sidetracks his attention as well as conditions their escape: 
‘Let us now crawl,’ said Bernard, ‘under the canopy of the currant leaves, and tell stories. 
Let us inhabit the underworld.” … “This is our universe, the others pass down the 
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carriage-drive. The skirts of Miss Hudson and Miss Curry sweep by like candle 
extinguishers. Those are Susan’s white socks. Those are Louis’ neat sand-shoes firmly 
printing the gravel. Here come warm gusts of decomposing leaves, of rotting vegetation. 
We are in a swamp now; in a malarial jungle. (Woolf, The Waves 16)  
First Bernard is representing the real world, but soon his urge to use the potential immanent in 
language takes over. Bernard is driven to “tell stories” and “inhabit the underworld.” The 
underworld is a world of representation, which Bernard creates and inhabits as a barrier against 
the real world and a space within which he can live. In the world of language, the young Bernard 
escapes both Miss Hudson and Miss Curry as well as being tied down into “neat sand-shoes” 
or “white socks.” But even the world of representation breaks down as Bernard is overwhelmed 
by the smell of “decomposing leaves” and “rotting vegetation.” Bernard first reacts against the 
sensation of his sight, but when the peripheral vision, the smells and the being-in-the-world 
overwhelms him, Bernard severs the contact with the real world completely. Bernard’s 
imagination takes him dreamily away from the immediate world into the ‘malarial jungle.’ 
Bernard uses both language as a means to distance himself from the norms and expectations of 
the real world and as a means to grasp the world fully. He, however, loses himself in the 
rottenness of his own imagination, as he gets caught in an imaginary “swamp” and “malarial 
jungle.” (Woolf, The Waves 16) Bernard’s continual interpretation of the external world, is a 
mode of being. A sublimation of the real through representation. It is a form of being that 
organises his relationship with the real. Bernard’s relationship to representation shows that 
language is not a tool to distance himself from the real world, instead language and 
representation is a way in which he lives in the world. It is a way for Bernard to experience 
reality. The epistemology of Modernism is in this sense internal in the performance of 
representation rather than a consideration of external factors.  
The relationship with reality, however, changes in Bernard’s abovementioned meeting 
with time while shaving. The changing experience of time and the breakdown in Bernard’s 
natural relationship with the world is crucial, because after the breakdown language loses its 
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ability to create an alternative world, Bernard can no longer represent and interpret the world 
sufficiently. It becomes necessary for Bernard to employ language differently in order to re-
establish a relationship with reality. Young Bernard’s descriptive urge stems from a need to see 
objective reality as imbued with radical possibility. Nothing is as it first seems. The problem 
which occurs to the older Bernard, is that he discovers that his interpretative urge is in fact only 
draping something which is there already. By employing beautiful language, he represents what 
is already there, language does not add anything as such. Bernard’s use of language leads to a 
disequilibrium in the relationship between the being-of-the-possible and the being-of-the-real.  
Deleuze explains that the sense which the individual is always established within a being 
that he conceptualises as having two forms: There are “two sorts of [sensible] beings, the being 
of the real as the matter of denotations and the being of the possible as the form of signification” 
(42, my emphasis). The being-of-the-possible has no less being than the being-of-the-real, and 
both beings come into relationship with the individual through sense. The two forms of being 
correspond to two specific moments in the individual’s relation with the external world. The 
individual grasps the external world as a compound of being-of-the-real and being-of-the-
possible. No matter how extraordinary the external world might be, it always denotes itself 
explicitly as a being-of-the-real, and it is explicitly grasped through the senses. But at the same 
time, as a being-of-the-possible, the external world continually signifies anew. In the experience 
of the external world, the being-of-the-real has prominence over being-of-the-possible, because 
the external world is established through subjective experience.  
This relationship, however, is different in fiction. Whereas fiction is an object in the 
external world, and the individual thereby relates to it as a being-of-the-real (it has objective 
matter that denotes itself), the individual predominately relates to the content of fiction as a 
being-of-the-possible – understood in the way that fiction continually inscribes new meaning 
in the experience of it. The knowledge produced by fiction is a ‘becoming’ sense, within an 
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intricate relation between being-of-the-real and a being-of-the-possible, this time dominated by 
the being-of-the-possible. This process of signification in fiction is volatile and unstable and it 
always starts over, but it is at the same time anchored in the text’s physical, denoting, reality.  
Deleuze’s ‘sense’ is an empirical epistemology, similar to that of Russell’s. It is in the 
nature of sense to be immediately at work in every experience of the external world. Sense and 
knowledge are made up of singular events that in turn make up various series of repetitive 
patterns, at the same time as continual development within the series themselves. Bernard’s 
urge toward representation is therefore peculiar, because his experience of the external world 
is already a form of knowledge, sense that makes sense. But he keeps on representing the world 
through language. The reason for this is that language has a different compound relation to 
being than that which makes up the real world. Representation is similarly made up by events 
that take place within repetitive series on several different levels, but it sparks a production of 
knowledge that is at first characterised by a continual becoming. Representation continually 
becomes. Deleuze emphasises the different role of language and representation in the 
production of knowledge. Language is the ontological “genesis” of knowledge (Deleuze 137). 
In this sense, both the production of fiction as well as the experience of fiction is an event of 
becoming real through the event that is the performance of language. This becoming is not 
related to the specific production of the artwork, or an artistic object as such, but rather the 
event in the performance itself. The experience of fiction, therefore, does not take place in a 
vacuum, but it is taking place in continual interaction with the object always inscribing new 
signification on it as well as the denoting physical object. Every time fiction is actualised in the 
experience of it, the actualisation is becoming, just as the events in Lewis Carroll’s novels, as 
Deleuze explains – “a pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-mad” (3). The 
production as well as the experience of fiction is a becoming which is always set within the 
series of language and within the series of the work itself. It is a becoming of the virtual and an 
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actualisation of possibilities, they form occurrences within an immanent sphere. To Deleuze, 
becoming is always an actualisation of the possibilities that are already immanently present in 
the world. The virtual designates a potential reality, but not a reality which is, for that reason, 
any less immanent in this world than the real (What Is Philosophy 156)23. The value of fiction, 
is that it designates an inherently unstable intermediary position between denotation and 
signification. It is both the being-of-the-real and at the same time always becoming qua it is 
also being-of-the-possible. The experience of fiction, and that of art in general, is progressive 
as it is always becoming denotation, always becoming knowledge.   
In order to get a better grasp of how knowledge is at stake in The Waves, I intend to 
investigate the series that Woolf lays out for the reader to get acquainted with through the 
rhythmic return. By following Deleuze’s interpretation of being, Woolf’s modernist fiction 
creates a mode of being that in the experience always is on the frontier, a becoming knowledge. 
Or in other words: It is “the articulation of the difference between” being-of-the-real and being-
of-the-possible that knowledge comes into play (Deleuze 35). It is the open-endedness of 
becoming that defines the difference between Woolf’s modernist fiction and the external world, 
and it makes clear that the knowledge at stake in fiction is similarly defined by the same 
becoming. Whereas the external world is characterised by a compound which is always 
somewhat stable, modernist fiction is inherently unstable. The pure event that fiction sets into 
motion is “neither private nor public, neither collective nor individual” (Deleuze 41), instead 
modernist fiction is the coming together of the present and the virtual in one singular moment 
in time – “sense … is an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface if things, a 
pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition.” (Deleuze 19) In other words, the reality 
of fiction, the intermediary position between being-of-the-possible and being-of-the-real,’ is 
                                                 
23 Deleuze, G., Guattari, F. What is Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994. print.    
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structured as an event that is never reduced to the denotation of an event, but at the same time 
it is also not reducible to only signification.  
James Williams explains in the book Gilles Deleuze’s logic of sense: a critical 
introduction and guide (2008)24 that Deleuze’s discovery in the Logic of Sense is that the 
concept of series, i.e. the structures of reality, always contain other series within them (15). But 
as every series contain other series, one series is unable to disclose anything final, and therefore, 
when series in this way always intersect and multiply and contain series within them, Deleuze 
needs the event in order to be able to think. It is in the relation between events and series that 
knowledge of the external world takes place. As every series is a repetition of fixed patterns 
and as there are series within series at every level of any investigation – as Deleuze writes: “The 
serial form is thus essentially multi-serial” (44) – the singular event through which the 
individual gain knowledge about the series becomes important. As I argued above, every event 
is made up of a compound of being-of-the-real and being-of-the-possible. The fixed patterns 
that make up series are made up by numerous homogeneous events, though every event within 
the pattern is singular. The continual repetition of almost homogenous events always reveals a 
divergence that transforms every series through its always ongoing repetition. The way in which 
series always shift and develop, but at the same time stays largely the same, means that “[n]o 
living problem is clear-cut and no strict distinction ever really solves a problem in life.” 
(Williams 8) The fact that within every series there is another series, and that every series is 
made up by an infinite number of events, offers a way in which to understand the special nature 
of knowledge at stake in The Waves, because, in the plot based novel, the author has committed 
him- or herself to investigating one part of one series only – the plot-based novel is an attempt 
at representing one single chain of events, but it disregards the fact that these events always 
already are a part of something larger. Woolf, who takes the possibility of knowledge at stake 
                                                 
24 Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze’s logic of sense: a critical introduction and guide. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2008. Print.  
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in fiction very seriously, attempts in The Waves to represent the world in accordance with the 
series and events that make up our lived experience. She does so by not reducing the open 
character of the serial nature of reality. Reality is multiserial and open ended just as The Waves. 
I will now develop further on the way in which The Waves uses series and events to expand on 
reality.  
 
IV – III Series in The Waves; a stylisation of becoming 
If we approach the knowledge at stake in the experience of The Waves from the perspective of 
the being-of-the-possible, signifying, and being-of-the-real, denoting, it is possible to approach 
the novel as a work of fiction that investigates the events taking place as the ontological origin 
of knowledge. The Waves is a stylisation of the continual becoming of knowledge.  
Thematically speaking the reader is experiencing the becoming of life throughout the 
novel as the speakers are never reduced to simple, one dimensional beings who designate one 
single allegorical or symbolic meaning. Instead they are continually inscribing their own 
presence on the world as well as discovering it. The six speakers are always becoming human. 
The Waves mirrors Deleuze’s event-becoming epistemology on a formal level too. Woolf’s 
experimental and innovative mode of storytelling – following a rhythm rather than a plot – is a 
project that accentuates the original becoming of the knowledge. By employing rhythm, Woolf 
recognises that it is impossible to reduce life to its result or contain a final story within one 
single plot. A novel based on a plot rather than rhythm develops according to the end of the 
story, not according to a natural development of the singularity of being. In the plot-based novel 
everything is valued in relation to the development of the plot itself. Following a rhythm 
instead, Woolf accommodates a form of fiction which in fact foregrounds a free performance 
and creation of knowledge – within the always becoming being-of-the-real from the being-of-
the-possible – in a manner which is different but still similar to the way in which sense creates 
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knowledge in reality. I will elaborate on this perspective of The Waves at a further stage, but 
first it is necessary to point out how the event, the coming together of being-of-the-real and 
being-of-the-possible, relates to the arching structure of series.  
Until now I have, in every reading I have performed of The Waves, done my best to focus 
on the representation of events taking place in the novel. It is an event when Bernard looks 
himself in the mirror and discovers that he is undergoing a transition toward old age, as well as 
it is an event in every speaker’s life when Percival dies. But as events take place within series, 
I will now attempt to investigate how Woolf employs series to relate the events of The Waves 
to knowledge of the external world in a more complete sense. The Waves reaches its apex in 
Bernard’s final monologue. Bernard’s last speech covers around fifty pages, a fifth of the novel, 
and it incorporates several of the stories the reader already knows from the previous soliloquies. 
In this final monologue Bernard articulates the impossibility of representing life as a final and 
graspable “globe, full of figures” (Woolf, The Waves 199). Bernard explains that it is impossible 
for language to encapsulate life in its totality. In this way, when attempting to retell the story of 
his life Bernard is confronted with the impotence of representation. But language is still – in 
spite of “all its debilities” as Beer puts it – according to Deleuze the genesis of knowledge. 
Bernard decides to revisit his life through varied events that make out the same series of 
occurrences. He attempts to retell his life as series. What he does differently is to let the story 
expand through singular events that all are awarded space and time without being organised by 
external narrative factors. Bernard experiments with the form of representation that also Woolf 
experiments with in The Waves, and his new narrative strategy is a way to “challenge the bounds 
of fiction” (Beer xv). He does so in order to make language again become a meaningful vessel 
of knowledge. The soliloquies that make up the novel, until Bernard’s last, are all singular 
events – or to use Woolf’s own words: singular waves – that make up the rhythmic nature of 
the book. In Bernard’s final monologue the intensities in all the events of the novel are being 
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revisited and the events make up one final wave. It is a super wave, through which Bernard 
hopes to achieve a form of fragmented mode of representation which is capable of doing what 
he has always failed to do: to represent the communal identity of modern life.  
Bernard starts out by describing how he discovered his own identity as a young boy, when 
the division between himself and his friends was not yet clear to him. He recalls that they all 
felt like being one communal being and that they “suffered terribly when [they] became separate 
bodies.” (Woolf, The Waves 202) Bernard’s first problem in relation to representation is the 
problem of identity. It seems to him, that identity is something which is created through sense 
perception. Bernard explains:  
Then Mrs Constable raised the sponge … squeezed it, and out shot, right, left, all down 
the spine, arrows of sensation. And so, as long as we draw breath, for the rest of time, if 
we knock against a chair, a table, or a woman, we are pierced with arrows of sensation—
if we walk in a garden, if we drink this wine. Sometimes indeed, when I pass a cottage 
with a light in the window where a child has been born, I could implore them not to 
squeeze the sponge over that new body. (Woolf, The Waves 200) 
Bernard here insinuates that sense is the origin of identity. The identity that Bernard is 
describing, however, is not yet an exclusive identity. Sense does not create an ‘I,’ but it creates 
presence, in the way that sense does not exclude being a part of a common, but the sensing body 
is created as a possibility for an ‘I.’ The creation of identity is taking place within a paradoxical 
space between the individual subject and the common subjectivity. This paradox is a possibility 
rather than a problem. In the passage above we learn that sense establishes presence. And with 
presence, the possibility of the ‘I’ is established. It seems, however that sense does not create 
either the ‘I’ or the common as it is only later in language that Bernard discovers his own being. 
The problematic relationship between identity and the common is to be found in language. 
Language is the genesis of knowledge and it is through language that the world becomes a part 
of logocentric knowledge. Language is then both the birth of knowledge and the birth of 
representation.  
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Through the paradoxical character of identity in The Waves it is possible to learn more 
about the relation between knowledge and fiction. Language is both a mode of deceit, as it is 
always already being representation, as well as the ontological origin of knowledge. In this 
sense language establishes the ‘I,’ the logocentric safeguard of a personal knowledge, but 
language also ensures that knowledge is communicable and common, which warrants that 
knowledge is in fact knowledge and therefore different from e.g. instinct. The discovery of 
identity is done through language, but it is a discovery which also unfolds the common. 
Knowledge is in this sense a constant battle between the identity of the ‘I’ and the communal 
and communicative experience of living. In the final soliloquy Bernard is constantly battling 
with this paradoxical nature of language and the way it creates identity. He is trying to set free 
the possibility of knowledge within representation, without transgressing the heterogeneous 
nature of identity as such. 
The question pertaining to representation, which Bernard is posing in the last soliloquy, 
is a question regarding the possibility of representation without the dominant and phallic ‘I.’ Is 
it possible for Bernard to represent the external world, without succumbing to the logocentrism 
of language? Language places us within the paradox (Deleuze 86) and it is not a question of 
breaking free from the paradox or maybe even solving it, but it is rather a question of existing 
in (or indeed subsisting) within it. “The force of paradoxes is that they are not contradictory; 
they rather allow us to be present at the genesis of the contradiction.” (Deleuze 86) What is at 
stake in language, both as logocentric representation as well as genesis of knowledge, is that 
the reader has to engage it as in effect interpretation. Representation continually has to adapt to 
the becoming knowledge. The interpretive process is characterised by a continual reciprocal 
motion of the creation of knowledge and the representation of this creation. In The Waves 
Bernard traces the paradox of language in the experience of individual/communal experience 
of life. 
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Bernard lives life through linguistic representation, hoping to grasp everything in 
language. But he realises that his “stories,” are made up from “ridiculous, flamboyant, beautiful 
phrases” (Woolf, The Waves 199). As Bernard recognises that representation is an empty 
gesture in itself, he becomes “tired” from “phrases that come down beautifully with all their 
feet on the ground!” (Woolf, The Waves 199). As a response Bernard starts narrating in a way 
that is fragmented and disjunctive, a form of representation that does not overwhelm the 
‘genesis of knowledge’ with an authorial and logocentric ‘I.’ This mode of writing attempts to 
use language within its own paradoxical horizon and it tries to facilitate a continual 
interpretative movement. Repetition becomes the key for Bernard. He pays close attention to 
matters that repeat themselves, shaving, for example, is continuously highlighted as well as the 
passing of time – “Tuesday follows Monday, Wednesday Tuesday.” (Woolf, The Waves 218) 
By focusing on repetitive patterns, the logocentric ‘I’ slowly dissipates and Bernard finds that 
he is no longer one person. He discovers his own multifaceted identity “There are many rooms 
– many Bernards.” (Woolf, The Waves 217) Knowledge is no longer a “static body of facts but 
constitutes a dynamic process of inquiry” (Semetsky 443)25 an inquiry which is always ongoing 
relation with the real through experience. Just as Bernard, in his childhood, suddenly discovers 
his own identity on account of one single compassionate feeling, “I felt my indifference melt. 
Neville did not melt. “Therefore,” I said, “I am myself, not Neville”, a wonderful discovery” 
(Woolf, The Waves 201) he also realises that he is not made of one single identity, but in fact 
many identities, by a sudden insight – “What I was to myself was different” (Woolf, The Waves 
217). 
In the final monologue Bernard narrates the discovery of his own identity and the 
subsequent loss thereof. Losing his identity in the many is a terrifying experience for Bernard, 
                                                 
25 Semetsky, Inna. “Deleuze as a Philosopher of Education: Affective Knowledge/Effective Learning.” The 
European Legacy (2009): 443–456. Web. 
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an experience, as it similarly is a loss of ‘Knowledge,’ understood as the logocentric truth. 
Bernard experiences a form of fear that follows the loss of stable forms. There are no longer 
‘Knowledge,’ instead there are ‘knowledges.’ This epiphany shakes Bernard and his position 
in society. It creates a fear in him that is nicely elucidated through his responsibilities as a father. 
Being pater familias demands an ‘I,’ it demands an identity that embodies sovereign power as 
well as ‘Knowledge.’ When Bernard loses his identity it forces him into desperation.  
I returned, however, to my own snug home and was warned by the parlourmaid to creep 
upstairs in my stockings. The child was asleep. I went to my room.  
‘Was there no sword, nothing with which to batter down these walls, this protection, this 
begetting of children and living behind curtains, and becoming daily more involved and 
committed, with books and pictures? Better burn one’s life out…” (Woolf, The Waves 
222) 
The epistemology of Modernism proposes a form of knowledge that disregards truth. The ’I’ 
and its logocentric truths are what Barnard is forced to struggle against in order to achieve 
redemption. Representation and language becomes a possibility for freedom, when they shed 
the inherent focus on truth and enters into a fruitful creation of knowledges. The final blow 
against the individuality of the ‘I’ comes as an experience of immersion. Bernard feels that the 
friends are all one. “[W]e had our bottle of wine, and under that seduction lost our enmity, and 
stopped comparing. And half-way through dinner, we felt enlarge itself round us the huge 
blackness of what is outside us, of what we are not. … And who were we? We were 
extinguished for a moment” (Woolf, The Waves 231). The six friends now finally, though 
briefly, come together again in one single identity – each becoming parts in a series – though 
without at any point not also forming six individuals. The novel begins with each of the 
characters becoming individuals, with the creation of their own subjectivity, and it ends with 
Bernard experiencing his own subjectivity melting together with the others’ into one. As 
Deleuze and Guattari comment in A Thousand Plateaus (2013)26 from Woolf’s Ms. Dalloway: 
                                                 
26 Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. Brian Massumi. 2013. London: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 2014. Print.  
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“Never again will I say “I am this I am that”.” (33) According to Bernard, the friends have 
seized being each a single fish, and instead they are becoming a school of fish (Woolf, The 
Waves 214). Bernard tries to represent the experience of being, without attempting to raise it to 
the level of ultimate truth. Instead he interpretively questions the experience repeatedly. “Was 
this, then, this streaming away mixed with Susan, Jinny, Neville, Rhoda, Louis, a sort of death?” 
(Woolf, The Waves 233).  
I have previously established, that the epistemology at stake in Modernism, is an 
epistemology that comes to life as a compound of both performance of knowledge as well as 
representation. What happens in The Waves, is that Woolf’s experimentation with using a 
rhythm rather than plot as the main narrative structure, plays with the compound-nature of 
fiction’s being. Woolf’s modernist fiction is no longer dominated by representation and the 
false ideal of full disclosure. Instead Woolf is trying to emphasise the performative character 
of fiction and the nature of the experience of fiction. It is in this way that Woolf’s Modernism 
becomes a creation of knowledge. Modernism is representing as well as performing an 
investigation of ‘knowledges’ rather than one knowledge. There is no final truth, only processes 
of investigation and exploration that start in the experience of Woolf’s modernist fiction. This 
means that knowledge is at stake on two levels of fiction rather than it all comes down to a 
static presentation of one philosophical system. Modernism shifts the way fiction works and 
by, to a larger extent, demanding that the reader to perform the content of the book in a different 
way than what is at stake in the realist novel, changes that which is at stake in the experience. 
As the modernist novel is manifesting itself and becoming denotation, the experience of fiction 
becomes conditioned by the peripheral vision. Knowledge establishes itself through immersion 
and through a constant hesitation for the process of signification is performed through a similar 
relationship like that of reality. Woolf’s modernist fiction becomes a valuable tool in the 
becoming of new knowledges, in gaining perspectives on new situations. The Waves is a 
Andersen 77 
 
practical exercise in the boundaries of language and representation. It is a laboratory of human 
behaviour. A laboratory that always is performing the same test on every one of its readers, and 
which always lets knowledges arise indiscriminately. This feature gives modernist fiction the 
ability to create knowledges about the world outside the text.  
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